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OPINION 
_______________ 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellants Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation 
(―Conestoga‖), Norman Hahn, Elizabeth Hahn, Norman 
Lemar Hahn, Anthony Hahn, and Kevin Hahn (collectively, 
―the Hahns‖) appeal from an order of the District Court 
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denying their motion for a preliminary injunction.  In their 
Complaint, Appellants allege that regulations promulgated by 
the Department of Health and Human Services (―HHS‖), 
which require group health plans and health insurance issuers 
to provide coverage for contraceptives, violate the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (―RFRA‖) and 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.
1
  The District Court denied a 
preliminary injunction, concluding that Appellants were 
unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims.  See 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 12-CV-
6744, 2013 WL 140110 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2013).  Appellants 
then filed an expedited motion for a stay pending appeal with 
this Court, which was denied.  See Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the United States Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., No. 13-1144, 2013 WL 1277419 (3d Cir. 
Feb. 8, 2013).  Now, we consider the fully briefed appeal from 
the District Court‘s denial of a preliminary injunction. 
 
 Before we can even reach the merits of the First 
Amendment and RFRA claims, we must consider a threshold 
issue: whether a for-profit, secular corporation is able to 
                                                   
1
 The Complaint also alleges that the regulations 
violate the Establishment Clause, the Free Speech Clause, the 
Due Process Clause, and the Administrative Procedure Act.  
While the District Court‘s opinion addressed some of these 
additional claims, Appellants have limited their appeal to 
whether the regulations violate the RFRA and the Free 
Exercise Clause. 
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engage in religious exercise under the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment and the RFRA.  As we conclude that for-
profit, secular corporations cannot engage in religious 
exercise, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
 
 
I. 
 
 In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (March 23, 2010) 
(―ACA‖).  The ACA requires employers with fifty or more 
employees to provide their employees with a minimum level 
of health insurance.  The ACA requires non-exempt group 
plans to provide coverage without cost-sharing for 
preventative care and screening for women in accordance with 
guidelines created by the Health Resources and Services 
Administration (―HRSA‖), a subagency of HHS.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4). 
 
 The HRSA delegated the creation of guidelines on this 
issue to the Institute of Medicine (―IOM‖).  The IOM 
recommended that the HRSA adopt guidelines that require 
non-exempt group plans to cover ―[a]ll Food and Drug 
Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization 
procedures, and patient education and counseling for women 
with reproductive capacity.‖
2
  These recommended guidelines 
                                                   
2
 See Women‘s Preventive Services: Required Health 
Plan Coverage Guidelines, available at 
www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last visited July 25, 2013). 
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were approved by the HRSA.  On February 15, 2012, HHS, 
the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Labor 
published final rules memorializing the guidelines.  See 77 
Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012).
3
  Under the regulations, group 
health plans and health insurance issuers are required to 
provide coverage consistent with the HRSA guidelines in plan 
years beginning on or after August 1, 2012, unless the 
employer or the plan is exempt.
4
  Appellants refer to this 
requirement as the ―Mandate,‖ and we use this term 
throughout this opinion.  Employers who fail to comply with 
the Mandate face a penalty of $100 per day per offending 
employee.  See 26 U.S.C. § 4980D.  The Department of Labor 
and plan participants may also bring a suit against an employer 
that fails to comply with the Mandate.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1132. 
 
II. 
                                                   
 
 
3
 These regulations were updated on July 2, 2013.  See 
78 Fed. Reg. 39870 (July 2, 2013).  The recent changes have 
no impact on this litigation. 
 
4
 The exemptions encompass ―grandfathered‖ plans, 
which are plans that were in existence on March 23, 2010, see 
45 C.F.R. § 147.140 and ―religious employers,‖ see 45 C.F.R. 
§ 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B).  Additionally, the ACA requirement 
to provide employer sponsored health insurance to employees 
is entirely inapplicable to employers that have fewer than 50 
employees.  See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), (c)(2)(A). 
 
 13 
 
 The Hahns own 100 percent of the voting shares of 
Conestoga.  Conestoga is a Pennsylvania for-profit corporation 
that manufactures wood cabinets and has 950 employees.  The 
Hahns practice the Mennonite religion.  According to their 
Amended Complaint, the Mennonite Church ―teaches that 
taking of life which includes anything that terminates a 
fertilized embryo is intrinsic evil and a sin against God to 
which they are held accountable.‖  (Am. Compl. ¶ 30.)
5
  
Specifically, the Hahns object to two drugs that must be 
provided by group health plans under the Mandate that ―may 
cause the demise of an already conceived but not yet attached 
human embryo.‖  (Id. at ¶ 45.)  These are ―emergency 
contraception‖ drugs such as Plan B (the ―morning after pill‖) 
and ella (the ―week after pill‖).  The Amended Complaint 
alleges that it is immoral and sinful for Appellants to 
intentionally participate in, pay for, facilitate, or otherwise 
support these drugs.  (Id. at ¶ 32.)  Conestoga has been subject 
to the Mandate as of January 1, 2013, when its group health 
plan came up for renewal.  As a panel of this Court previously 
                                                   
5
 In addition, on October 31, 2012, Conestoga‘s Board 
of Directors adopted ―The Hahn Family Statement on the 
Sanctity of Human Life,‖ which provides, amongst other 
things, that ―The Hahn Family believes that human life begins 
at conception (at the point where an egg and sperm unite) and 
that it is a sacred gift from God and only God has the right to 
terminate human life.  Therefore, it is against our moral 
conviction to be involved in the termination of human life 
through abortion, suicide, euthanasia, murder, or any other 
acts that involve the taking of human life.‖  (Id. at ¶ 92.) 
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denied an injunction pending appeal, Conestoga is currently 
subject to the Mandate, and in fact, Appellants‘ counsel 
represented during oral argument that Conestoga is currently 
complying with the Mandate. 
 
 
III. 
 
We review a district court‘s denial of a preliminary 
injunction for abuse of discretion, but review the underlying 
factual findings for clear error and questions of law de novo.  
Am. Express Travel Related Servs. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 
F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 2012).  The District Court had 
jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  This Court 
has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 
 
―A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show: 
(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer 
irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting 
preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the 
nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors such 
relief.‖  Kos Pharms, Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 
(3d Cir. 2004).  A plaintiff seeking an injunction must meet all 
four criteria, as ―[a] plaintiff‘s failure to establish any element 
in its favor renders a preliminary injunction inappropriate.‖  
NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 
(3d Cir. 1999).  This is the same standard applied in the 
District Court, and, on appeal, no party has questioned its 
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accuracy.
6
  We will first consider whether Appellants are 
likely to succeed on the merits of their claim, beginning with 
the claims asserted by Conestoga, a for-profit, secular 
corporation. 
 
IV. 
 
A. 
 
 First, we turn to Conestoga‘s claims under the First 
Amendment.  Under the First Amendment, ―Congress shall 
make no law respecting the establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.‖  The threshold question 
for this Court is whether Conestoga, a for-profit, secular 
corporation, can exercise religion.  In essence, Appellants 
offer two theories under which we could conclude that 
Conestoga can exercise religion: (a) directly, under the 
Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Citizens United, and (b) 
indirectly, under the ―passed through‖ method that has been 
articulated by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  We 
will discuss each theory in turn. 
                                                   
6
 The dissent has undertaken a scholarly survey of the 
proper standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction 
throughout the country.  However, Appellants never took an 
appeal of the preliminary injunction standard applied by the 
District Court.  (See Appellants‘ Br. at 4-6 (statement of 
issues presented for review).)  Moreover, the dissent 
acknowledges that it ―may be true‖ that the plaintiff‘s failure 
to satisfy any element in its favor renders a preliminary 
injunction inappropriate.  (Dissenting Op. at 9.) 
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 In Citizens United, the Supreme Court held that ―the 
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of 
the speaker‘s corporate identity,‖ and it accordingly struck 
down statutory restrictions on corporate independent 
expenditure.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 
U.S. 310, 365 (2010).  Citizens United recognizes the 
application of the First Amendment to corporations generally 
without distinguishing between the Free Exercise Clause and 
the Free Speech Clause, both which are contained within the 
First Amendment.  Accordingly, whether Citizens United is 
applicable to the Free Exercise Clause is a question of first 
impression.  See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. 
Ct. 641, 643 (2012) (Sotomayor, Circuit Justice) (―This court 
has not previously addressed similar RFRA or free exercise 
claims brought by closely held for-profit corporations and 
their controlling shareholders . . . .‖). 
 
 While ―a corporation is ‗an artificial being, invisible, 
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law,‘ . . .  a 
wide variety of constitutional rights may be asserted by 
corporations.‖  Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pataki, 292 
F.3d 338, 347 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Dartmouth Coll. v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (Marshall, 
C.J.))  In analyzing whether constitutional guarantees apply to 
corporations, the Supreme Court has held that certain 
guarantees are held by corporations and that certain guarantees 
are ―purely personal‖ because ―the ‗historic function‘ of the 
particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of 
individuals.‖  First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 778 n.14 (1978) (internal citation omitted).  The Bellotti 
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Court observed: 
 
Corporate identity has been determinative in 
several decisions denying corporations certain 
constitutional rights, such as the privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination, Wilson 
v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382–386, 31 S. 
Ct. 538, 545–546, 55 L. Ed. 771 (1911), or 
equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a 
right to privacy, California Bankers Assn. v. 
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65–67, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 
1519–1520, 39 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1974); United 
States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651–
652, 70 S. Ct. 357, 368–369, 94 L. Ed. 401 
(1950), but this is not because the States are free 
to define the rights of their creatures without 
constitutional limit. Otherwise, corporations 
could be denied the protection of all 
constitutional guarantees, including due process 
and the equal protection of the laws. Certain 
―purely personal‖ guarantees, such as the 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, 
are unavailable to corporations and other 
organizations because the ―historic function‖ of 
the particular guarantee has been limited to the 
protection of individuals. United States v. 
White, 322 U.S. 694, 698–701, 64 S. Ct. 1248, 
1251–1252, 88 L. Ed. 1542 (1944). Whether or 
not a particular guarantee is ―purely personal‖ 
or is unavailable to corporations for some other 
reason depends on the nature, history, and 
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purpose of the particular constitutional 
provision. 
Id.  Thus, we must consider whether the Free Exercise Clause 
has historically protected corporations, or whether the 
―guarantee is ‗purely personal‘ or is unavailable to 
corporations‖ based on the ―nature, history, and purpose of 
[this] particular constitutional provision.‖  Id. 
 
 In Citizens United, the Supreme Court pointed out that 
it has ―recognized that First Amendment protection extends to 
corporations.‖  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342.  It then cited 
to more than twenty cases, from as early as the 1950‘s, 
including landmark cases such as New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), in which the Court recognized 
that First Amendment free speech rights apply to corporations.  
See id.  The Citizens United Court particularly relied on 
Bellotti, which struck down a state-law prohibition on 
corporate independent expenditures related to referenda issues.  
Bellotti held: 
 
We thus find no support in the First or 
Fourteenth Amendment, or in the decisions of 
this Court, for the proposition that speech that 
otherwise would be within the protection of the 
First Amendment loses that protection simply 
because its source is a corporation that cannot 
prove, to the satisfaction of a court, a material 
effect on its business or property.  [That 
proposition] amounts to an impermissible 
legislative prohibition of speech based on the 
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identity of the interests that spokesmen may 
represent in public debate over controversial 
issues and a requirement that the speaker have a 
sufficiently great interest in the subject to 
justify communication. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784.  Discussing Bellotti’s rationale, 
Citizens United stated that the case ―rested on the principle 
that the Government lacks the power to ban corporations from 
speaking.‖  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 347; see also Pac. 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 
(1986) (―The identity of the speaker is not decisive in 
determining whether speech is protected‖ as ―[c]orporations 
and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the 
‗discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and 
ideas‘ that the First Amendment seeks to foster.‖) (quoting 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795). 
 
Citizens United is thus grounded in the notion that the 
Court has a long history of protecting corporations‘ rights to 
free speech.  Citizens United overruled Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), a case in which 
the Court had ―uph[eld] a direct restriction on the independent 
expenditure of funds for political speech for the first time in 
[this Court‘s] history.‖  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 347 
(quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 695 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).  
The Citizens United Court found that it was ―confronted with 
conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line that forbids 
restrictions on political speech based on the speaker‘s 
corporate identify and a post-Austin line that permits them.‖  
Id. at 348.  Faced with this conflict, the Court decided that 
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Austin was wrongly decided, based on the otherwise 
consistent line of cases in which corporations were found to 
have free speech rights. 
 
 We must consider the history of the Free Exercise 
Clause and determine whether there is a similar history of 
courts providing free exercise protection to corporations.  We 
conclude that there is not.  In fact, we are not aware of any 
case preceding the commencement of litigation about the 
Mandate, in which a for-profit, secular corporation was itself 
found to have free exercise rights.
7
  Such a total absence of 
caselaw takes on even greater significance when compared to 
the extensive list of Supreme Court cases addressing the free 
speech rights of corporations. 
 
 After all, as the Supreme Court observed in Schempp, 
the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause ―is to secure religious 
liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof 
by civil authority.‖  Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 
374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (emphasis added).  And as the 
District Court aptly noted in its opinion, ―[r]eligious belief 
takes shape within the minds and hearts of individuals, and its 
protection is one of the more uniquely ‗human‘ rights provided 
                                                   
7
 We acknowledge that the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, in an eight judge en banc panel, in six separate 
opinions, recently held that for-profit, secular corporations 
can assert RFRA and free exercise claims in some 
circumstances.  See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 
12-6294, 2013 WL 3216103 (10th Cir. June 27, 2013).  We 
respectfully disagree with that Court‘s analysis. 
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by the Constitution.‖  Conestoga, 2013 WL 140110, at *7.  
We do not see how a for-profit ―artificial being, invisible, 
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law,‖ Consol. 
Edison Co., 292 F.3d at 346 (quoting Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. 
at 636 (Marshall, C.J.)), that was created to make money could 
exercise such an inherently ―human‖ right.  
 
 We are unable to determine that the ―nature, history, 
and purpose‖ of the Free Exercise Clause supports the 
conclusion that for-profit, secular corporations are protected 
under this particular constitutional provision.  See Bellotti¸ 435 
U.S. at 778 n.14.  Even if we were to disregard the lack of 
historical recognition of the right, we simply cannot 
understand how a for-profit, secular corporation—apart from 
its owners—can exercise religion.  As another court 
considering a challenge to the Mandate noted: 
 
General business corporations do not, separate 
and apart from the actions or belief systems of 
their individual owners or employees, exercise 
religion. They do not pray, worship, observe 
sacraments or take other religiously-motivated 
actions separate and apart from the intention 
and direction of their individual actors. 
 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 
1291 (W.D. Okla. 2012), rev’d en banc, No. 12-6294, 2013 
WL 3216103 (10th Cir. June 27, 2013); see also Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 2013 WL 3216103, at *51 (Briscoe, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (questioning 
―whether a corporation can ‗believe‘ at all, see Citizens 
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United, 130 S.Ct. at 972 (‗It might also be added that 
corporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no 
thoughts, no desires.‘) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).‖). 
 
 In urging us to hold that for-profit, secular corporations 
can exercise religion, Appellants, as well as the dissent, cite to 
cases in which courts have ruled in favor of free exercise 
claims advanced by religious organizations.  See, e.g., 
Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 
546 U.S. 418 (2006); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 
v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).  None of the cases relied on 
by the dissent involve secular, for-profit corporations.  We will 
not draw the conclusion that, just because courts have 
recognized the free exercise rights of churches and other 
religious entities, it necessarily follows that for-profit, secular 
corporations can exercise religion.  As the Supreme Court 
recently noted, ―the text of the First Amendment . . . gives 
special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations.‖  
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. 
EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012).  That churches—as means 
by which individuals practice religion—have long enjoyed the 
protections of the Free Exercise Clause is not determinative of 
the question of whether for-profit, secular corporations should 
be granted these same protections.  
 
Appellants also argue that Citizens United is applicable 
to the Free Exercise Clause because ―the authors of the First 
Amendment only separated the Free Exercise Clause and the 
Free Speech Clause by a semi-colon, thus showing the 
continuation of intent between the two.‖  (Appellants‘ Br. at 
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34.)  We are not persuaded that the use of a semi-colon means 
that each clause of the First Amendment must be interpreted 
jointly. 
 
In fact, historically, each clause has been interpreted 
separately.  Accordingly, the courts have developed different 
tests in an effort to apply these clauses.  For example, while 
the various clauses of the First Amendment have been 
incorporated and made applicable to the states by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme 
Court did so at different times.  Incorporation of the clauses of 
the First Amendment began with Gitlow v. New York, 268 
U.S. 652, 666 (1925), where the Court noted that ―we may and 
do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are 
protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by 
Congress—are among the fundamental rights and ‗liberties‘ 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from impairment by the States.‖  More than ten 
years later, in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), the 
Court incorporated the right of peaceable assembly.  In doing 
so, the Court cited to Gitlow, and noted that ―[t]he right of 
peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech 
and free press and is equally fundamental.‖  Id. at 364.  The 
language is important—even though the Free Speech Clause 
and the Petition Clause appear next to one another in the First 
Amendment, the Court did not find that Gitlow had already 
decided that the Petition Clause was incorporated, but rather 
cited Gitlow as precedent to expand the incorporation doctrine 
to cover the Petition Clause. 
 
Several years later, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
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U.S. 296 (1940), the Supreme Court incorporated the Free 
Exercise Clause.  The Cantwell Court did not cite to Gitlow as 
authority for incorporating the Free Exercise Clause; in other 
words, it did not automatically follow that the Free Exercise 
Clause was incorporated just because the Free Speech Clause 
was incorporated.  Seven years after Cantwell, in Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Court incorporated 
the Establishment Clause.  In Everson, the Court cited to 
Cantwell and noted that the Court‘s interpretation of the Free 
Exercise Clause should be applied to the Establishment 
Clause.  Id. at 15.  But notably, it took seven years for the 
Court to hold this; and following the same pattern, Cantwell 
did not automatically incorporate the Establishment Clause.  
Thus, it does not automatically follow that all clauses of the 
First Amendment must be interpreted identically. 
 
Second, Appellants argue that Conestoga can exercise 
religion under a ―passed through‖ theory, which was first 
developed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
EEOC v. Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Company, 
859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988), and affirmed in Stormans, Inc. v. 
Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009).  In Townley and 
Stormans, the Ninth Circuit held that for-profit corporations 
can assert the free exercise claims of their owners. 
 
In Townley, the plaintiff was a closely-held 
manufacturing company whose owners made a ―covenant 
with God requir[ing] them to share the Gospel with all of 
their employees.‖  Townley, 859 F.2d at 620.  Townley, the 
plaintiff corporation, sought an exemption, on free exercise 
grounds, from a provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
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that required it to accommodate employees asserting religious 
objections to attending the company‘s mandatory devotional 
services.  Although the plaintiff urged the ―court to hold that 
it is entitled to invoke the Free Exercise Clause on its own 
behalf,‖ the Ninth Circuit deemed it ―unnecessary to address 
the abstract issue whether a for profit corporation has rights 
under the Free Exercise Clause independent of those of its 
shareholders and officers.‖ Id. at 619-20.  Rather, the court 
concluded that, ―Townley is merely the instrument through 
and by which Mr. and Mrs. Townley express their religious 
beliefs.‖ Id. at 619.  As ―Townley presents no rights of its 
own different from or greater than its owners‘ rights,‖ the 
Ninth Circuit held that ―the rights at issue are those of Jake 
and Helen Townley.‖ Id. at 620.  The court then examined the 
rights at issue as those of the corporation‘s owners, ultimately 
concluding that Title VII‘s requirement of religious 
accommodation did not violate the Townleys‘ free exercise 
rights.  Id. at 621. 
 
The Ninth Circuit subsequently applied Townley‘s 
reasoning in Stormans.  There, a pharmacy brought a Free 
Exercise Clause challenge to a state regulation requiring it to 
dispense Plan B, an emergency contraceptive drug.  
Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1117.  In analyzing whether the 
pharmacy had standing to assert the free exercise rights of its 
owners, the court emphasized that the pharmacy was a 
―fourth-generation, family-owned business whose 
shareholders and directors are made up entirely of members 
of the Stormans family.‖  Id. at 1120.  As in Townley, it 
―decline[d] to decide whether a for-profit corporation can 
assert its own rights under the Free Exercise Clause and 
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instead examine[d] the rights at issue as those of the corporate 
owners.‖  Id. at 1119.  The court concluded that the pharmacy 
was ―an extension of the beliefs of members of the Stormans 
family, and that the beliefs of the Stormans family are the 
beliefs of‖ the pharmacy.  Id. at 1120.  Because the pharmacy 
did ―not present any free exercise rights of its own different 
from or greater than its owners‘ rights,‖ the Ninth Circuit 
held, as it had in Townley, that the company had ―standing to 
assert the free exercise rights of its owners.‖  Id. 
 
Appellants argue that Conestoga is permitted to assert 
the free exercise claims of the Hahns, its owners, under the 
Townley/Stormans ―passed through‖ theory.  After carefully 
considering the Ninth Circuit‘s reasoning, we are not 
persuaded.  We decline to adopt the Townley/Stormans theory, 
as we believe that it rests on erroneous assumptions regarding 
the very nature of the corporate form.  In fact, the Ninth 
Circuit did not mention certain basic legal principles 
governing the status of a corporation and its relationship with 
the individuals who create and own the entity.  It is a 
fundamental principle that ―incorporation‘s basic purpose is to 
create a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, 
powers, and privileges different from those of the natural 
individuals who created‖ the corporation.  Cedric Kushner 
Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001).  The 
―passed through‖ doctrine fails to acknowledge that, by 
incorporating their business, the Hahns themselves created a 
distinct legal entity that has legally distinct rights and 
responsibilities from the Hahns, as the owners of the 
corporation.  See Barium Steel Corp. v. Wiley, 108 A.2d 336, 
341 (Pa. 1954) (―It is well established [under Pennsylvania 
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law] that a corporation is a distinct and separate entity, 
irrespective of the persons who own all its stock.‖).  The 
corporate form offers several advantages ―not the least of 
which was limitation of liability,‖ but in return, the 
shareholder must give up some prerogatives, ―including that of 
direct legal action to redress an injury to him as primary 
stockholder in the business.‖  Kush v. Am. States Ins. Co., 853 
F.2d 1380, 1384 (7th Cir. 1988).  Thus, under Pennsylvania 
law—where Conestoga is incorporated—―[e]ven when a 
corporation is owned by one person or family, the corporate 
form shields the individual members of the corporation from 
personal liability.‖  Kellytown Co. v. Williams, 426 A.2d 663, 
668 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).  
 
Since Conestoga is distinct from the Hahns, the 
Mandate does not actually require the Hahns to do anything.  
All responsibility for complying with the Mandate falls on 
Conestoga.  Conestoga ―is a closely-held, family-owned firm, 
and [we] suspect there is a natural inclination for the owners of 
such companies to elide the distinction between themselves 
and the companies they own.‖  Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 
850, 857 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting).  But, it is 
Conestoga that must provide the funds to comply with the 
Mandate—not the Hahns.  We recognize that, as the sole 
shareholders of Conestoga, ultimately the corporation‘s profits 
will flow to the Hahns.  But, ―[t]he owners of an LLC or 
corporation, even a closely-held one, have an obligation to 
respect the corporate form, on pain of losing the benefits of 
that form should they fail to do so.‖  Id. at 858 (Rovner, J., 
dissenting).  ―The fact that one person owns all of the stock 
does not make him and the corporation one and the same 
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person, nor does he thereby become the owner of all the 
property of the corporation.‖  Wiley, 108 A.2d at 341.  The 
Hahn family chose to incorporate and conduct business 
through Conestoga, thereby obtaining both the advantages and 
disadvantages of the corporate form.  We simply cannot ignore 
the distinction between Conestoga and the Hahns.  We hold—
contrary to Townley and Stormans—that the free exercise 
claims of a company‘s owners cannot ―pass through‖ to the 
corporation. 
 
B. 
 
 Next, we consider Conestoga‘s RFRA claim.  Under the 
RFRA, ―[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a 
person‘s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a 
rule of general applicability [unless the burden] (1) is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is 
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.‖  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a)-(b).  As 
with the inquiry under the Free Exercise Clause, our 
preliminary inquiry is whether a for-profit, secular corporation 
can assert a claim under the RFRA.  Under the plain language 
of the statute, the RFRA only applies to a ―person‘s exercise 
of religion.‖  Id. at § 2000bb-1(a).  
 
 Our conclusion that a for-profit, secular corporation 
cannot assert a claim under the Free Exercise Clause 
necessitates the conclusion that a for-profit, secular 
corporation cannot engage in the exercise of religion.  Since 
Conestoga cannot exercise religion, it cannot assert a RFRA 
claim.  We thus need not decide whether such a corporation is 
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a ―person‖ under the RFRA. 
 
V. 
 
 Finally, we consider whether the Hahns, as the owners 
of Conestoga, have viable Free Exercise Clause and RFRA 
claims on their own.  For the same reasons that we concluded 
that the Hahns‘ claims cannot ―pass through‖ Conestoga, we 
hold that the Hahns do not have viable claims.  The Mandate 
does not impose any requirements on the Hahns.  Rather, 
compliance is placed squarely on Conestoga.  If Conestoga 
fails to comply with the Mandate, the penalties—including 
fines, see 26 U.S.C. § 4980D, and civil enforcement, see 29 
U.S.C. § 1132—would be brought against Conestoga, not the 
Hahns.  As the Hahns have decided to utilize the corporate 
form, they cannot ―move freely between corporate and 
individual status to gain the advantages and avoid the 
disadvantages of the respective forms.‖  Potthoff v. Morin, 245 
F.3d 710, 717 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Kush, 853 F.2d at 
1384).  Thus, we conclude that the Hahns are not likely to 
succeed on their free exercise and RFRA claims. 
 
VI. 
 
 As Appellants have failed to show that they are likely to 
succeed on the merits of their Free Exercise Clause and RFRA 
claims, we need not decide whether Appellants have shown 
that they will suffer irreparable harm, that granting preliminary 
relief will not result in even greater harm to the Government, 
and that the public interest favors the relief of a preliminary 
injunction.  See NutraSweet Co., 176 F.3d at 153 (―A 
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plaintiff‘s failure to establish any element in its favor renders a 
preliminary injunction inappropriate.‖).  Therefore, we will 
affirm the District Court‘s order denying Appellants‘ motion 
for a preliminary injunction. 
 
*  * * 
 
 We recognize the fundamental importance of the free 
exercise of religion.  As Congress stated, in passing the RFRA 
and restoring the compelling interest test to laws that 
substantially burden religion, ―the framers of the Constitution, 
recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, 
secured its protection in the First Amendment to the 
Constitution.‖  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a).  Thus, our decision 
here is in no way intended to marginalize the Hahns‘ 
commitment to the Mennonite faith.  We accept that the Hahns 
sincerely believe that the termination of a fertilized embryo 
constitutes an  ―intrinsic evil and a sin against God to which 
they are held accountable,‖ (Compl. ¶ 30), and that it would be 
a sin to pay for or contribute to the use of contraceptives 
which may have such a result.  We simply conclude that the 
law has long recognized the distinction between the owners of 
a corporation and the corporation itself.  A holding to the 
contrary—that a for-profit corporation can engage in religious 
exercise—would eviscerate the fundamental principle that a 
corporation is a legally distinct entity from its owners. 
  
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., et al. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., et al., (No. 13-1144) 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
Having previously dissented from the denial of a stay 
pending appeal in this case, I now have a second opportunity 
to consider the government‟s violation of the religious 
freedoms of Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation 
(“Conestoga”) and its owners, the Hahns, a family of devout 
Mennonite Christians who believe in the sanctity of human 
life.  The Hahns do not want to be forced to pay for other 
people to obtain contraceptives and sterilization services, 
particularly the drugs known as “Plan B” (or the “morning 
after pill”) and “Ella” (or the “week after pill”), which they 
view as chemical killers of actual lives in being.  Sadly, the 
outcome for the Hahns and their business is the same this 
time as it was the last time they were before us.  My 
colleagues, at the government‟s urging, are willing to say that 
the Hahns‟ choice to operate their business as a corporation 
carries with it the consequence that their rights of conscience 
are forfeit.  
 
That deeply disappointing ruling rests on a cramped 
and confused understanding of the religious rights preserved 
by Congressional action and the Constitution.  The 
government takes us down a rabbit hole where religious rights 
are determined by the tax code, with non-profit corporations 
able to express religious sentiments while for-profit 
corporations and their owners are told that business is 
business and faith is irrelevant.  Meanwhile, up on the 
surface, where people try to live lives of integrity and 
purpose, that kind of division sounds as hollow as it truly is.  I 
 2 
 
do not believe my colleagues or the District Court judge 
whose opinion we are reviewing are ill-motivated in the least, 
but the outcome of their shared reasoning is genuinely tragic, 
and one need not have looked past the first row of the gallery 
during the oral argument of this appeal, where the Hahns 
were seated and listening intently, to see the real human 
suffering occasioned by the government‟s determination to 
either make the Hahns bury their religious scruples or watch 
while their business gets buried.  So, as I did the last time this 
case was before us, I respectfully dissent. 
 
I.   Background 
 
Five members of the Hahn family – Norman, 
Elizabeth, Norman Lemar, Anthony, and Kevin – own 100 
percent of Conestoga, which Norman founded nearly fifty 
years ago and which, as noted by the Majority, is a 
Pennsylvania corporation that manufactures wood cabinets.  
(Maj. Op. at 12.)  The Hahns are hands-on owners.  They 
manage their business and try to turn a profit, with the help of 
Conestoga‟s 950 full-time employees.  It is undisputed that 
the Hahns are entirely committed to their faith, which 
influences all aspects of their lives.  They feel bound, as the 
District Court observed, “to operate Conestoga in accordance 
with their religious beliefs and moral principles.”  Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6744, 2013 WL 
140110, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. ll, 2013).   One manifestation of 
that commitment is the “Statement on the Sanctity of Human 
Life” adopted by Conestoga‟s Board of Directors on October 
31, 2012, proclaiming that  
 
[t]he Hahn Family believes that human life 
begins at conception (at the point where an egg 
 3 
 
and sperm unite) and that it is a sacred gift from 
God and only God has the right to terminate 
human life.  Therefore it is against our moral 
conviction to be involved in the termination of 
human life through abortion, suicide, 
euthanasia, murder, or any other acts that 
involve the deliberate taking of human life. 
 
Id. at *18 n.5. 
 
Accordingly, the Hahns believe that facilitating the use 
of contraceptives, especially ones that destroy a fertilized 
ovum,
1
 is a violation of their core religious beliefs.  (Am. 
                                              
1
 Their concern seems aimed particularly at 
contraceptives that work after conception (see Am. Compl. at 
9 (noting concern over mandated “drugs or devices that may 
cause the demise of an already conceived but not yet attached 
human embryo, such as „emergency contraception‟ or „Plan 
B‟ drugs (the so called „morning after‟ pill)”), and the 
concern apparently increases the further along in the 
development of the fertilized egg that the contraceptive action 
of a drug or device takes place (see id. at 10 (discussing 
objections to “a drug called „ella‟ (the so called „week after‟ 
pill), which studies show can function to kill embryos even 
after they have attached to the uterus, by a mechanism similar 
to the abortion drug RU-486”).  Being forced to assist in the 
acquisition and use of abortifacients is obviously of great 
concern to them.  (See Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 10-11 
(“[T]he Hahns believe that it would be sinful and immoral for 
them to intentionally participate in, pay for, facilitate, or 
otherwise support any contraception with an abortifacient 
effect through health insurance coverage they offer at 
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Conestoga.”).)   
At oral argument, counsel for the government insisted 
that “abortifacient” is a “theological term,” and that, “for 
federal law purposes, a device that prevents a fertilized egg 
from implanting in the uterus,” like Plan B and Ella, “is not 
an abortifacient.”  (Oral Arg. at 37:13-37:45.)  There was 
something telling in that lecture, and not what counsel 
intended.  One might set aside the highly questionable 
assertion that “abortifacient” is a “theological” and not a 
scientific medical term, which must come as a surprise to the 
editors of dictionaries that include entries like the following: 
“abortifacient [MED] Any agent that induces abortion.”  
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms, 
6th ed. (2003).  And one could further ignore what appears to 
be an ongoing debate on whether drugs like Ella are 
technically abortifacients.  (See Amicus Br. of Ass‟n of Am. 
Physicians & Surgeons at 11 (arguing that “the low 
pregnancy rate for women who take ella four or five days 
after intercourse suggests that the drug must have an 
„abortifacient‟ quality”); D.J. Harrison & J.G. Mitroka, 
Defining Reality: The Potential Role of Pharmacists in 
Assessing the Impact of Progesterone Receptor Modulators 
and Misoprostol in Reproductive Health, 45 Annals 
Pharmacotherapy 115, 116 (Jan. 2011) (cited in Ass‟n of Am. 
Physicians & Surgeons et al. Amicus Br. at 10 n.15) 
(concluding that, based on data, “it can be reasonably 
expected that the [FDA-approved] dose of ulipristal [Ella] 
will have an abortive effect on early pregnancy in humans”).)  
Though the Hahns‟ objections to contraception may be more 
intense as a zygote matures and implants, the point of this 
case, after all, is not who among contending doctors and 
scientists may be correct about the abortion-inducing qualities 
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Compl. ¶ 30, 32.)  Conestoga, at the Hahns‟ direction, had 
previously provided health insurance that omitted coverage 
for contraception. (Am. Compl. ¶ 3.)  Then came the Patient 
                                                                                                     
of Ella or other drugs that the government wants to make the 
Hahns and their business buy for employees through forced 
insurance coverage.  Whether a fertilized egg, being acted 
upon by a drug or device, is aborted after implantation or is 
never implanted at all is not pertinent to the Hahns‟ belief that 
a human life comes into being at conception and therefore the 
destruction of that entity is the taking of a human life.  That 
belief is the point of this case, and the government is in no 
position to say anything meaningful about the Hahns‟ 
perspective on when life begins.  But counsel‟s comment 
during argument does say something meaningful about the 
government‟s desire to avoid anything that might smack of 
religion in this case involving questions of religious freedom.  
The government evidently would like to drain the debate of 
language that might indicate the depth of feeling the Hahns 
have about what they are being coerced to do.  “Keep the 
conversation as dry and colorless as possible,” is the message.  
Don‟t let anything that sounds like “abortion” come up, lest 
the weight of that word disturb a happily bland consideration 
of corporate veils and insurance contracts.  Like it or not, 
however, big issues – life and death, personal conscience, 
religious devotion, the role of government, and liberty – are 
in play here, and the government‟s effort to downplay the 
stakes is of no help.  It does, however, highlight the 
continuing importance of the First Amendment, which “is an 
effort, not entirely forlorn, to interpose a bulwark between the 
prejudices of any official, legislator or judge and the stirrings 
of the spirit.”  EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 
610, 624 (9th Cir. 1988) (Noonan, J., dissenting).  
 6 
 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “ACA”) and related 
regulations, and the Hahns‟ previous decisions about 
employee benefits were no longer something the government 
would tolerate.  Under rules effectively written by an entity 
called the “Institute of Medicine,”
2
 corporations like 
Conestoga must purchase employee health insurance plans 
                                              
2
 To attribute the rules to government personnel is 
unduly generous.  As the Majority obliquely observes (see 
Maj. Op. at 11), the rules in question here are not the product 
of any legislative debate, with elected representatives 
considering the political sensitivities and constitutional 
ramifications of telling devout Mennonites to fund the 
destruction of what they believe to be human lives.  They are 
not even the result of work within an administrative agency of 
the United States.  They are instead the result of the ACA 
assigning regulatory authority to a subunit of the Department 
of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) known as the Health 
Resources and Services Administration, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
13(a)(4), which in turn turned the drafting over to the Institute 
of Medicine.  (See Maj. Op. at 11.)  What the Majority does 
not do is identify what the Institute of Medicine is.  It is not 
an agency of the United States government, or of any other 
public entity.  It is a private organization that, according to its 
website, “works outside of government to provide unbiased 
and authoritative advice to decision makers and the public.”  
See About the IOM, http://www.iom.edu/About-IOM.aspx 
(last visited July 25, 2013).  That self-serving declaration of 
its qualifications will not be of much comfort to those who 
wonder how a private organization, not answerable to the 
public, has ended up dictating regulations that the government 
insists overrides the Appellants‟ constitutional rights to 
religious liberty.  
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that include coverage for “[a]ll Food and Drug 
Administration [(“FDA”)] approved contraceptive methods, 
sterilization procedures, and patient education and 
counseling” – including so-called emergency contraceptives 
such as Plan B and Ella – “for all women with reproductive 
capacity, as prescribed by a provider.”  77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 
8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (alterations in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  This is what has been dubbed the 
“contraception mandate” (the “Mandate”), and it brooks no 
exception for those, like the Appellants, who believe that 
supporting the use of certain contraceptives is morally 
reprehensible and contrary to God‟s word.
3
  If the Hahns fail 
to have Conestoga submit to the offending regulations, the 
company will be subject to a “regulatory tax” – a penalty or 
fine – that will amount to about $95,000 per day and will 
rapidly destroy the business and the 950 jobs that go with it.
4
  
                                              
3
 There are plenty of other exceptions, however, as I 
will discuss later.  See infra Part III.A.2.b.i. 
4
  According to 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(a), “[t]here is … a 
tax on any failure of a group health plan to meet the 
requirements of chapter 100 (relating to group health plan 
requirements).”  The $95,000 estimate of the penalty takes 
account only of Conestoga‟s 950 employees.  The actual 
penalty could amount to much more, given that the statute 
subjects noncompliant companies to a $100 per-day penalty 
for “any failure” to provide the mandated coverage “with 
respect to each individual to whom such failure relates.”  Id. 
§ 4980D(b)(1).  Presumably, “„individual‟ means each 
individual insured” by the company, Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc. v. Sebelius, __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 3216103, at *5 (10th 
Cir. 2013) (en banc), including employees‟ family members.  
Regardless, dead is dead, and Conestoga would as surely die 
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(See Maj. Op. at 13 (noting that “Conestoga is currently 
complying with the Mandate”).)   
 
Conestoga and the Hahns now argue that the Mandate 
is forcing them, day by day, to either disobey their religious 
convictions or to incur ruinous fines.  That Hobson‟s choice, 
they say, violates both the First Amendment and the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), 42 
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.  I agree. 
 
II. Standard of Review 
 
To qualify for preliminary injunctive relief, a litigant 
must demonstrate “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; 
(2) that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is 
denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief will not result in 
even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the 
public interest favors such relief.”  Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx 
Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004).  “We review the 
denial of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion, 
an error of law, or a clear mistake in the consideration of 
proof,” and “any determination that is a prerequisite to the 
issuance of an injunction is reviewed according to the 
                                                                                                     
a rapid death under the weight of $95,000 per-day fines as it 
would under even higher fines. 
In the alternative, Conestoga presumably could drop 
employee health insurance altogether, and it would then face 
a reduced fine of $2,000 per full-time employee per year 
(totaling $1.9 million).  See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H.   Neither 
party has briefed that option, and it is unclear what additional 
consequences might follow from such action, including 
upward pressure on wages, etc. 
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standard applicable to that particular determination.”  Id. 
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).  We 
therefore “exercise plenary review over the district court‟s 
conclusions of law and its application of law to the facts … .”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Highly relevant to this 
case, “a court of appeals must reverse if the district court has 
proceeded on the basis of an erroneous view of the applicable 
law.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
The Majority gives short shrift to the dispute over the 
standard of review that emerged during the earlier appeal in 
this case.  My colleagues say simply that “[a] plaintiff‟s 
failure to establish any element in its favor renders a 
preliminary injunction inappropriate.”  (Maj. Op. at 14 
(quoting NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., Inc., 176 F.3d 
151, 153 (3d Cir. 1999)) (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  That may be true, but it fails to 
address the problem that arose from the District Court‟s 
erroneous application of a more rigid standard than our case 
law requires.  In explaining away the numerous decisions 
around the country that have decided that the government 
should be preliminarily enjoined from enforcing the Mandate, 
the Court claimed that those other decisions were the result of 
“a less rigorous standard” for the granting of preliminary 
injunctive relief than the standard in this Circuit.  Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp., 2013 WL 140110, at *4.  More 
specifically, the Court said that those decisions “applied a 
„sliding scale approach,‟ whereby an unusually strong 
showing of one factor lessens a plaintiff‟s burden in 
demonstrating a different factor.”
5
  Id.  It then contrasted that 
                                              
5
 See Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 
6757353, at *2 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012) (noting that “[t]he 
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approach with what it characterized as this Court‟s approach, 
saying, “the Third Circuit … has no such „sliding scale‟ 
standard, and Plaintiffs must show that all four factors favor 
preliminary relief.”  Id.  The Majority hardly mentions the 
District Court‟s mistaken belief that our standard is more 
                                                                                                     
more the balance of harms tips in favor of an injunction, the 
lighter the burden on the party seeking the injunction to 
demonstrate that it will ultimately prevail,” and granting 
preliminary injunction pending appeal); Grote v. Sebelius, 
708 F.3d 850, 853 n.2 (7th Cir. 2013) (adopting the reasoning 
of Korte and applying the same “sliding scale” standard); 
Monaghan v. Sebelius, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2012 WL 6738476, 
at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2012) (“Courts ... may grant a 
preliminary injunction even where the plaintiff fails to show a 
strong or substantial probability of success on the merits, but 
where he at least shows serious questions going to the merits 
and irreparable harm which decidedly outweighs any 
potential harm to the defendant if the injunction is issued.”); 
Am. Pulverizer Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
No. 12-3459, 2012 WL 6951316, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 
2012) (applying a sliding scale standard and concluding that 
“the balance of equities tip strongly in favor of injunctive 
relief in this case and that Plaintiffs have raised questions 
concerning their likelihood of success on the merits that are 
so serious and difficult as to call for more deliberate 
investigation”); Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 
904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 113 (D.D.C. 2012) (applying a sliding 
scale standard by which, “[i]f the movant makes an unusually 
strong showing on one of the factors, then it does not 
necessarily have to make as strong a showing on another 
factor” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 11 
 
daunting than the standard employed by other courts, nor that 
the District Court failed to apply binding precedent in which 
we have adopted the functional equivalent of a sliding scale 
standard. 
 
It is true that we have not used the label “sliding scale” 
to describe our standard for preliminary injunctions, as 
numerous other circuit courts of appeals have.
6
  But we have 
                                              
6
 At least six circuits have explicitly adopted a “sliding 
scale” approach for evaluating a motion for a preliminary 
injunction.  See McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 
1016 n.7 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he „sliding scale‟ approach to 
preliminary injunctions remains valid: A preliminary 
injunction is appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates that 
serious questions going to the merits were raised and the 
balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff‟s favor.” 
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)); Davis v. 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291-92 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009) (“The four factors have typically been evaluated 
on a „sliding scale.‟  If the movant makes an unusually strong 
showing on one of the factors, then it does not necessarily 
have to make as strong a showing on another factor.”); Cavel 
Int’l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(endorsing a “„sliding scale‟ approach” pursuant to which “if 
the appeal has some though not necessarily great merit, then 
the showing of harm of … [great] magnitude … would justify 
the granting of an injunction pending appeal provided … that 
the defendant would not suffer substantial harm from the 
granting of the injunction”); In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust 
Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 526 (4th Cir. 2003) (“In applying th[e] 
four-factor test, the irreparable harm to the plaintiff and the 
harm to the defendant are the two most important factors.  
 12 
 
said that, “in a situation where factors of irreparable harm, 
interests of third parties and public considerations strongly 
favor the moving party, an injunction might be appropriate 
even though plaintiffs did not demonstrate as strong a 
likelihood of ultimate success as would generally be 
required.”  Constructors Ass’n of W. Pa. v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 
811, 815 (3d Cir. 1978).  On another occasion, we observed 
that “[a]ll of [the four preliminary injunction] factors often 
are weighed together in the final decision and the strength of 
the plaintiff‟s showing with respect to one may affect what 
will suffice with respect to another.”  Marxe v. Jackson, 833 
F.2d 1121, 1128 (3d Cir. 1987).  And again, we have said, 
“proper judgment entails a „delicate balancing‟ of all 
elements.”  Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 630 
F.2d 120, 136 (3d Cir. 1980) (quoting Kreps, 573 F.2d at 815) 
                                                                                                     
Emphasis on the balance of these first two factors results in a 
sliding scale that demands less of a showing of likelihood of 
success on the merits when the balance of hardships weighs 
strongly in favor of the plaintiff, and vice versa.” (alteration 
and internal quotation marks omitted)); Gately v. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2 F.3d 1221, 1232 (1st Cir. 
1993) (noting “the general principle that irreparable harm is 
subject to a sliding scale analysis, such that the showing of 
irreparable harm required of a plaintiff increases in the 
presence of factors … which cut against a court‟s traditional 
authority to issue equitable relief”); Fla. Med. Ass’n, Inc. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 601 F.2d 199, 203 n.2 
(5th Cir. 1979) (when evaluating a motion for a preliminary 
injunction, “a sliding scale can be employed, balancing the 
hardships associated with the issuance or denial of a 
preliminary injunction with the degree of likelihood of 
success on the merits”). 
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(internal quotation marks omitted).
7
  If those precedents are 
not the expression and application of a sliding scale, allowing 
                                              
7
 As noted, see supra note 6, six circuits have used the 
label “sliding scale” to describe their approach to reviewing 
requests for preliminary injunctions.  Almost all of the 
remaining circuits have, like us, adopted an approach that, if 
not in name, mirrors the so-called sliding scale approach.  See 
Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 503 (8th Cir. 2006) (“No 
single factor is dispositive, as the district court must balance 
all factors to determine whether the injunction should 
issue.”); Doe v. Sundquist, 106 F.3d 702, 707 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(“We are mindful that even when a plaintiff‟s probability of 
success on the merits of a claim is not very high, a 
preliminary injunction may be appropriate if the plaintiff is in 
serious danger of irreparable harm absent an injunction.  Thus 
we have observed that the degree of likelihood of success that 
need be shown to support a preliminary injunction varies 
inversely with the degree of injury the plaintiff might 
suffer.”); Roso-Lino Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co. of N.Y., Inc., 749 F.2d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(per curiam) (“In our circuit a preliminary injunction will be 
issued when there is a showing of (a) irreparable harm and (b) 
either (1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) 
sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make 
them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships 
tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary 
relief.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Otero Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Mo., 665 
F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir. 1981) (“The Tenth Circuit has 
adopted the Second Circuit‟s liberal definition of the 
„probability of success‟ requirement.  When the other three 
requirements for a preliminary injunction are satisfied, it will 
 14 
 
the strength of a showing on one factor to compensate for a 
weaker but still positive showing on another, I confess I do 
not know what to make of them.  The District Court ignored 
the import of Kreps, Marxe, and Eli Lilly, despite our saying 
that a party can succeed in gaining injunctive relief if the 
threatened harm is particularly great and offsets a showing on 
“likelihood of success” that is less than might ordinarily be 
required.  The Court thus erred, and we should say so. 
 
Unlike the Majority, which tacitly endorses the District 
Court‟s application of an incorrect and unduly restrictive 
standard of review, I would apply the standard mandated by 
our own case law and used in the vast majority of our sister 
circuits.
8
 
                                                                                                     
ordinarily be enough that the plaintiff has raised questions 
going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and 
doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus 
for more deliberate investigation.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
Only one circuit appears to have rejected a balancing 
approach outright.  The Eleventh Circuit “has not recognized” 
a sliding scale approach where there are “sufficiently serious 
questions going to the merits [that] make them a fair ground 
for litigation and [where there is] a balance of hardships 
tipping decidedly toward the party requesting preliminary 
relief.”  Snook v. Trust Co. of Ga. Bank of Savannah, N.A., 
909 F.2d 480, 483 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
8
 I have discussed the correct standard of review at 
length only to emphasize that, in view of the particularly 
heavy and irreparable harm that the Hahns and Conestoga are 
now suffering and will continue to suffer as a result of the 
 15 
 
III. Discussion 
 
The Majority, like the District Court, evaluates only 
one of the four preliminary injunction factors: the likelihood 
of the Hahns‟ and Conestoga‟s success on the merits.
9
  
Holding that the “Appellants have failed to show that they are 
                                                                                                     
Majority‟s holding, see infra Part III.B, this case clearly 
meets the requirements for a preliminary injunction.  But 
even under the stricter standard applied by the District Court, 
I would still hold, for the reasons I provide in the remainder 
of this dissent, that the Hahns and Conestoga have made the 
necessary showing.  See Hobby Lobby, 2013 WL 3216103, at 
*8 (“[W]e need not resolve whether this relaxed standard 
would apply here, given that a majority of the court holds that 
Hobby Lobby and Mardel have satisfied the likelihood-of-
success prong under the traditional standard.”). 
9
 The government has not asserted that the Anti-
Injunction Act, which precludes judicial consideration of suits 
seeking to “restrain[] the assessment or collection of any 
[federal] tax,” 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), applies to this case.  As a 
result, that line of argument is waived.  See Hobby Lobby, 
2013 WL 3216103, at *35 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[A] 
waivable defense … is all the [Anti-Injunction Act] 
provides.”).  At any rate, I would hold with the en banc ruling 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
that the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply in a case like this.  
See id. at *7 (“[The for-profit corporate appellants] are not 
seeking to enjoin the collection of taxes or the execution of 
any IRS regulation; they are seeking to enjoin the 
enforcement, by whatever method, of one HHS regulation 
that they claim violates their RFRA rights.”). 
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likely to succeed on the merits of their Free Exercise Clause 
and RFRA claims,” the Majority “[does] not decide whether 
Appellants have shown that they will suffer irreparable harm, 
that granting preliminary relief will not result in even greater 
harm to the Government, [or] that the public interest favors 
the relief of a preliminary injunction.”  (Maj. Op. at 29.)  My 
colleagues thereby avoid addressing, let alone weighing, the 
additional factors.  I believe that they are wrong about the 
likelihood of success that both the Hahns and Conestoga 
should be credited with, and I am further persuaded that the 
remaining three factors, particularly the showing of 
irreparable harm, weigh overwhelmingly in favor of relief, as 
I will endeavor to explain. 
 
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
This case is one of many filed against the government 
in recent months by for-profit corporations and their owners 
seeking protection from the Mandate.  Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corp., 2013 WL 140110, at *5.  So far, most of 
those cases have reached the preliminary injunction stage 
only, and a clear majority of courts has determined that 
temporary injunctive relief is in order.
10
  I join that consensus, 
                                              
10
 See Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
No. 1:13-cv-00104-EGS, slip op. at 1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 
2013) (granting on court‟s own motion injunction pending 
appeal after first denying plaintiffs‟ motion on March 21, 
2013); Annex Med., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-1118, slip op. at 6 
(8th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013) (granting injunction pending appeal); 
Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 855 (7th Cir. 2013) (same); 
Korte, 2012 WL 6757353, at *2 (granting motion for 
injunction pending appeal because appellants “have 
 17 
 
                                                                                                     
established both a reasonable likelihood of success on the 
merits and irreparable harm, and [because] the balance of 
harms tips in their favor”); O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., No. 12-3357, slip op. at 1 (8th Cir. Nov. 28, 
2012) (granting “[a]ppellants‟ motion for stay pending 
appeal,” without further comment); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 
v. Sebelius, No. 5:12-cv-01000-HE, slip op. at 3 (W.D. Okla. 
July 19, 2013) (enjoining government “from any effort to 
apply or enforce, as to plaintiffs, the substantive requirements 
imposed in 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) and at issue in this 
case, or the penalties related thereto”); Beckwith Elec. Co. v. 
Sebelius, No. 8:13-cv-0648, 2013 WL 3297498, at *19 (M.D. 
Fla. June 25, 2013) (holding that religious rights are “not 
relinquished by efforts to engage in free enterprise under the 
corporate form,” and granting motion for preliminary 
injunction); Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-00207, 
2013 WL 3071481, at *12 (W.D. Pa. June 18, 2013) (granting 
motion for preliminary injunction); Hartenbower v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:13-CV-02253 (N.D. 
Ill. Apr. 18, 2013) (granting unopposed motion for 
preliminary injunction); Hall v. Sebelius, No. 13-0295 (D. 
Minn. Apr. 2, 2013) (granting unopposed motion for 
preliminary injunction); Tonn & Blank Constr., LLC v. 
Sebelius, No. 1:12-CV-325 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 1, 2013) (granting 
unopposed motion for preliminary injunction); Bick Holding, 
Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 4:13-cv-00462-AGF (E.D. Mo. Apr. 1, 
2013) (granting unopposed motion for preliminary 
injunction); Lindsay v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
No. 13-c-1210, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2013) 
(preliminary injunction granted with “agreement of the 
parties”); Monaghan v. Sebelius, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2013 WL 
1014026, at *11 (granting preliminary injunction because 
 18 
 
                                                                                                     
“[t]he Government has failed to satisfy its burden of showing 
that its actions were narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
interest,” and plaintiffs therefore “established at least some 
likelihood of succeeding on the merits of their RFRA claim”); 
Sioux Chief Mfg. Co. v. Sebelius, No. 13-0036, slip op. (W.D. 
Mo. Feb. 28, 2013) (granting unopposed motion for 
preliminary injunction); Triune Health Grp., Inc. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 12-06756, slip op. at 1 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2013) (granting motion for preliminary 
injunction); Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., No. 2:12-CV-92-DDN, 2012 WL 6738489, at 
*7 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 31, 2012) (holding that “plaintiffs are 
entitled to injunctive relief that maintains the status quo until 
the important relevant issues have been more fully heard”); 
Am. Pulverizer, 2012 WL 6951316, at *5 (granting 
preliminary injunction because “the balance of equities tip 
strongly in favor of injunctive relief in this case and [because] 
Plaintiffs have raised questions concerning their likelihood of 
success on the merits that are so serious and difficult as to call 
for more deliberate investigation”); Tyndale, 904 F. Supp. 2d 
at 129 (granting preliminary injunction to publishing 
corporation and its president because they had “shown a 
strong likelihood of success on the merits of their RFRA 
claim,” and because the other preliminary injunction factors 
favored granting the motion); Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. 
Supp. 2d 980, 999 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (granting preliminary 
injunction to for-profit, family-owned and operated 
corporation and holding that “[t]he harm in delaying the 
implementation of a statute that may later be deemed 
constitutional must yield to the risk presented here of 
substantially infringing the sincere exercise of religious 
beliefs”); Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1299 
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(D. Colo. 2012) (granting preliminary injunction, holding that 
“[t]he balance of the equities tip strongly in favor of 
injunctive relief in this case”).  But see Eden Foods, Inc. v. 
Sebelius, No. 13-1677, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. June 28, 2013) 
(denying injunction pending appeal and stating that it is “not 
persuaded, at this stage of the proceedings, that a for-profit 
corporation has rights under the RFRA” and that burden to 
company‟s owner “is too attenuated”); Autocam Corp. v. 
Sebelius, No. 12-2673, slip op. at 3 (6th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012) 
(denying motion for injunction pending appeal); Mersino 
Mgmt. Co. v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-11296, slip op. at 2 (E.D. 
Mich. July 11, 2013) (denying motion for preliminary 
injunction); Armstrong v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-00563 (D. 
Colo. May 10, 2013) (denying motion for preliminary 
injunction); MK Chambers Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., No. 13-11379, 2013 WL 1340719, at *7 (E.D. 
Mich. Apr. 3, 2013) (denying request for a temporary 
restraining order); Briscoe v. Sebelius, No. 13-00285, 2013 
WL 755413, at *5 (D. Colo. Feb. 27, 2013) (relying on 
recently overturned Hobby Lobby decisions to deny 
temporary restraining order).   
In addition to those cases, the Fourth Circuit recently 
declined to rule on a challenge to the contraception Mandate 
in a case remanded to it by the Supreme Court, because the 
plaintiffs “did not challenge these regulations, or make any 
argument related to contraception or abortifacients, in the 
district court, in their first appeal … , or in their Supreme 
Court briefs.”  Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, No. 10-2347, slip 
op. at 58, __ F.3d __ (4th Cir. July 11, 2013). 
The Sixth Circuit‟s order denying preliminary 
injunctive relief in Autocam is of little persuasive value.  In 
its order, the court acknowledged “conflicting decisions,” but 
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and note also the recent en banc decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit holding that two for-
profit companies had “established [that] they are likely to 
succeed on their RFRA claim” and that the Mandate 
threatened them with irreparable harm.
11
  Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 3216103, at *24 
(10th Cir. June 27, 2013) (en banc). 
 
                                                                                                     
it denied injunctive relief because the district court in that 
case issued a “reasoned opinion” and because “the Supreme 
Court[] [had] recent[ly] deni[ed] … an injunction pending 
appeal in Hobby Lobby.”  Autocam, No. 12-2673, slip op. at 2  
(citing Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641 
(Dec. 26, 2012) (Sotomayor, J., as Circuit Justice).  The 
Supreme Court opinion the Autocam court referred to was an 
in-chambers decision by Justice Sotomayor, acting alone, 
denying the plaintiffs‟ motion for an injunction pending 
appellate review.  Hobby Lobby Stores, 133 S. Ct. 641.  She 
denied the motion under the particular standard for issuance 
of an extraordinary writ by the Supreme Court, id. at 643, 
which differs significantly from our standard for evaluating a 
motion for a preliminary injunction.  Under that more 
demanding standard, the entitlement to relief must be 
“„indisputably clear.‟”  Id. (quoting Lux v. Rodrigues, 131 S. 
Ct. 5, 6 (Sept. 30, 2010) (Roberts, C.J., as Circuit Justice)).  
The Autocam court‟s reliance on her opinion is therefore 
misplaced, and its decision is otherwise devoid of 
explanation. 
11
 The Hobby Lobby court remanded the case for a 
determination regarding the remaining two preliminary 
injunction factors.  Id. at *26. 
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To demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, a 
“plaintiff need only prove a prima facie case, not a certainty 
that he or she will win.”  Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health 
Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 173 (3d Cir. 2001).  “[L]ikelihood 
of success” means that a plaintiff has “a reasonable chance, or 
probability, of winning.”  Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. 
Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).  It 
“does not mean more likely than not.”
12
  Id.  In the sense 
pertinent here, the term “likelihood” embodies “[t]he quality 
of offering a prospect of success,” or showing some promise.  
Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. I, at 1625 (compact ed., 
1986) (emphasis added).  The Appellants have shown the 
requisite prospect of success. 
 
 1. Conestoga’s Right to Assert RFRA and 
   First Amendment Claims 
 
I begin where the Majority begins and ends, with the 
issue of Conestoga‟s claim to religious liberty.
13
  This may be 
thought of as a question of standing, and, though it was not 
couched that way in the briefing or argument before us, it has 
been addressed as such by other courts.  E.g., Hobby Lobby, 
                                              
12
 Indeed, because the showing necessary for an 
injunction falls well below certainty, we have held that “this 
„probability‟ ruling” is insufficient to establish that a party 
has “prevail[ed]” based solely on its being awarded a 
preliminary injunction.  Milgram, 650 F.3d at 229. 
13
 As I am addressing the Majority‟s reasoning, I begin 
with this point rather than the statutory question of whether 
Conestoga is a “person” under RFRA.  As I explain below, 
see infra note 23, I believe that it is. 
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2013 WL 3216103, at *6; Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. 
Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 114-19 (D.D.C. 2012); 
Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 987-90 (E.D. Mich. 
2012).  However it may be framed, the government‟s 
assertion and the Majority‟s conclusion that Conestoga lacks 
any right to the free exercise of religion is flawed because the 
Constitution nowhere makes the “for-profit versus non-profit” 
distinction invented by the government, and the language and 
logic of Supreme Court jurisprudence justify recognizing that 
for-profit corporations like Conestoga are entitled to religious 
liberty. 
 
The Majority declares that there is no “history of 
courts providing free exercise protection to corporations.”  
(Maj. Op. at 20.)  As my colleagues see it, “„[r]eligious belief 
takes shape within the minds and hearts of individuals, and its 
protection is one of the more uniquely human rights provided 
by the Constitution‟” (id. at 20-21 (quoting Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corp., 2013 WL 140110, at *7)), so religion must 
be “an inherently „human‟ right” that cannot be exercised by 
a corporation like Conestoga (id. at 21).
 
 That reasoning fails 
for several reasons.  First, to the extent it depends on the 
assertion that collective entities, including corporations, have 
no religious rights, it is plainly wrong, as numerous Supreme 
Court decisions have recognized the right of corporations to 
enjoy the free exercise of religion.
 14
  See, e.g., Church of the 
                                              
14
 The Majority thinks it important that corporations 
lack the anthropomorphic qualities of individual religious 
devotion – “„[t]hey do not pray, worship, observe sacraments 
or take other religiously-motivated actions separate and apart 
from the intention and direction of their individual actors.‟”  
(Maj. Op. at 21 (quoting Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. 
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Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
525-26 (1993) (recognizing the petitioner as a corporation 
whose congregants practiced the Santeria religion, and 
concluding that city ordinances violated the corporation‟s and 
its members‟ free exercise rights); Corp. of Presiding Bishop 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 
                                                                                                     
Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1291 (W.D. Okla. 2012), 
rev’d en banc, No. 12-6294, 2013 WL 3216103 (10th Cir. 
June 27, 2013)); see also id. (citing Hobby Lobby, 2013 WL 
3216103, at *51 (Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (questioning “whether a corporation can 
„believe‟ at all”)); id. at 21-22 (citing Citizens United v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 466 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It might also be 
added that corporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no 
feelings, no thoughts, no desires.”)).)  Of course, corporations 
do not picket, or march on Capitol Hill, or canvas door-to-
door for moral causes either, but the Majority would not 
claim that corporations do not have First Amendment rights 
to free speech or to petition the government.  Corporations 
have those rights not because they have arms and legs but 
because the people who form and operate them do, and we 
are concerned in this case with people, even when they 
operate through the particular form of association called a 
corporation.  See infra note 17.  It is perhaps no accident that 
the only support my colleagues put forward to show that a 
corporation‟s lack of body parts deprives it of religious liberty 
is a district court case that has been reversed, a dissent in a 
court of appeals case, and a dissent in a Supreme Court case.  
An argument that has lost three times is not necessarily wrong 
for that record, but maybe the record says something about 
the argument. 
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483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987) (recognizing the petitioner as a 
corporation in a case concerning free exercise rights); Bob 
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.29 (1983) 
(allowing two corporations that operated schools but could 
not be characterized as “churches or other purely religious 
institutions” to assert free exercise rights).   
 
Taking the argument to be somewhat narrower, though 
– that it is only for-profit corporations that are sealed off from 
First Amendment religious liberty – it still fails.  There is no 
reason to suppose that a profit motive places a corporation 
further away from what is “inherently human” than other 
sorts of motives, so the distinction the Majority draws has no 
intrinsic logic to recommend it.  It also places far too much 
weight on a supposed lack of precedent.  While authority is 
admittedly scanty, that is in all probability because there has 
never before been a government policy that could be 
perceived as intruding on religious liberty as aggressively as 
the Mandate, so there has been little reason to address the 
issue.
15
  And, in any event, there is an obvious counterpoint to 
the Majority‟s observation: there may not be directly 
supporting case law, but the “conclusory assertion that a 
corporation has no constitutional right to free exercise of 
religion is [also] unsupported by any cited authority.”  
McClure v. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844, 850 
                                              
15
 The press reports are not in the record, but one 
would have to have been cut off from all media to miss the 
uproar created by the Mandate.  See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, A 
Flood of Suits Fights Coverage of Birth Control, New York 
Times, Jan. 26, 2013, at A1 (describing “a high-stakes clash 
between religious freedom and health care access that appears 
headed to the Supreme Court”). 
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(Minn. 1985).  In fact, it appears that, far from rejecting the 
proposition that for-profit corporations may have religious 
liberty interests, the Supreme Court has reserved the issue for 
a later time.  Cf. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (declining to “address the abstract 
question whether corporations have the full measure of rights 
that individuals enjoy under the First Amendment”); Amos, 
483 U.S. at 345 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(noting that “[i]t is also conceivable that some for-profit 
activities could have a religious character,” and leaving open 
the issue of whether for-profit enterprises could have a 
religious exemption from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964); id. at 349 (O‟Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(expressly leaving open the same question). 
 
The Majority slips away from its own distinction 
between for-profit and non-profit entities when it tries to 
support its holding with a citation to the Supreme Court‟s 
observation that the Free Exercise Clause “„secure[s] 
religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions 
thereof by civil authority.‟”  (Maj. Op. at 20 (quoting Sch. 
Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963)) 
(emphasis omitted).)  If that out-of-context clause really 
meant, as the Majority argues, that the right was limited to 
individuals, then all groups would be left in the cold, not just 
for-profit corporations.  But that is manifestly not what the 
quoted language means.  Not only does the Majority‟s 
interpretation fly in the face of the already cited authority 
establishing that groups of people have free exercise rights as 
surely as each individual does, it falters simply as a matter of 
reason.  To recognize that religious convictions are a matter 
of individual experience cannot and does not refute the 
collective character of much religious belief and observance. 
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Religious opinions and faith are in this respect akin to 
political opinions and passions, which are held and exercised 
both individually and collectively.  “An individual‟s freedom 
to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the 
redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from 
interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to 
engage in group effort toward those ends were not also 
guaranteed.”  Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 
(1984).  And just as the Supreme Court has described the free 
exercise of religion as an “individual” right, see Schempp, 
374 U.S. at 223, it has previously said the same thing of the 
freedom of speech, see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 
666 (1925) (calling freedom of speech a “fundamental 
personal right[]”), and still, notwithstanding that occasional 
characterization, there are a multitude of cases upholding the 
free speech rights of corporations.  E.g., Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010) 
(recognizing that “First Amendment protection extends to 
corporations” and listing cases to that effect).  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has specifically “rejected the argument that 
political speech of corporations or other associations should 
be treated differently under the First Amendment simply 
because such associations are not „natural persons.‟”  Id. at 
343 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776).  It thus does nothing 
to advance the discussion to say that the Free Exercise Clause 
secures religious liberty to individuals.  Of course it does.  
That does not mean that associations of individuals, including 
corporations, lack free exercise rights.   
 
I am not suggesting that corporations enjoy all of the 
same constitutionally grounded rights as individuals do.  They 
do not, as the Supreme Court noted in First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, saying, “[c]ertain purely personal 
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guarantees … are unavailable to corporations and other 
organizations because the historic function of the particular 
guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals.”  
435 U.S. at 778 n.14 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65-67 (1974) 
(declining to extend to a corporation the right to privacy to 
the same extent as individuals); Wilson v. United States, 221 
U.S. 361, 382-86 (1911) (finding that the privilege against 
self-incrimination does not apply to corporations).  The 
question in a case like this thus becomes “[w]hether or not a 
particular guarantee is „purely personal.‟”  Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
at 778 n.14.  And that, in turn, “depends on the nature, 
history, and purpose of the particular constitutional 
provision.”  Id.   
 
Contrary to the Majority‟s conclusion, there is nothing 
about the “nature, history, and purpose” of religious exercise 
that limits it to individuals.  Quite the opposite; believers have 
from time immemorial sought strength in numbers.  They lift 
one another‟s faith and, through their combined efforts, 
increase their capacity to meet the demands of their doctrine.  
The use of the word “congregation” for religious groups 
developed for a reason.  Christians, for example, may rightly 
understand the Lord‟s statement that, “where two or three are 
gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of 
them,” Matt. 18:20, to be not only a promise of spiritual 
outpouring but also an organizational directive.  It thus cannot 
be said that religious exercise is a purely personal right, one 
that “cannot be utilized by or on behalf of any organization, 
such as a corporation.”  United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 
699 (1944).   It is exercised by organizations all the time. 
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Wait, says the government in response to such 
reasoning; don‟t get carried away by facts; any collective 
right to religious exercise must be limited to organizations 
that are specifically and exclusively dedicated to religious 
ends.  As the government and the Majority see it, religious 
rights are more limited than other kinds of First Amendment 
rights.  All groups can enjoy secular free expression and 
rights to assembly, but only “religious organizations” have a 
right to religious liberty.  (See Appellee‟s Br. at 17 
(“[W]hereas the First Amendment freedoms of speech and 
association are „right[s] enjoyed by religious and secular 
groups alike,‟ the First Amendment‟s Free Exercise Clause 
„gives special solicitude to the rights of religious 
organizations.‟” (quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706, 713 
(2012))); Maj. Op. at 18, 22 (acknowledging that “First 
Amendment free speech rights apply to corporations,” but 
declining to “draw the conclusion that, just because courts 
have recognized the free exercise rights of churches and other 
religious entities, it necessarily follows that for-profit, secular 
corporations can exercise religion”).)  Of course, that view 
leaves it to the government to decide what qualifies as a 
“religious organization,” which ought to give people serious 
pause since one of the central purposes of the First 
Amendment is to keep the government out of the sphere of 
religion entirely.  Cf. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. 
of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (“[T]he First 
Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and 
government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each 
is left free from the other within its respective sphere.”). 
 
Assuming, however, that the government had the 
competence to decide who is religious enough to qualify as a 
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“religious organization,”
16
 there is no reason to suppose that 
the Free Exercise guarantee is as limited as the government 
                                              
16
 Some wading into those waters has become 
inevitable.  A handful of federal statutes create exemptions 
for “a religious corporation, association, educational 
institution, or society.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (Title VII); 
see also id. § 12113(d)(1), (2) (similar language in the 
Americans with Disabilities Act).  In LeBoon v. Lancaster 
Jewish Community Center Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 
2007), we examined whether a Jewish community center 
qualified as a “religious organization” for purposes of Title 
VII to determine whether it was exempt from compliance 
with the religious discrimination provisions of Title VII‟s 
Section 702.  Under a multi-factor test, we determined that 
the community center qualified as a “religious corporation, 
organization, or institution,” because (1) “religious 
organizations may engage in secular activities without 
forfeiting protection under Section 702”; (2) “religious 
organizations need not adhere absolutely to the strictest tenets 
of their faiths to qualify for Section 702 protection”; (3) 
“religious organizations may declare their intention not to 
discriminate … without losing the protection of Section 702”; 
and (4) “the organization need not enforce an across-the-
board policy of hiring only coreligionists.”  Id. at 229-30.  
In contrast to that rather broad view of whether an 
organization qualifies for a religious exemption under Title 
VII, the definition of the term “religious employer” in the 
Mandate was notably cramped.  See 45 C.F.R. 
§ 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B) (defining “religious employers” as 
“organization[s] that meet[] all of the following criteria: (1) 
The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the 
organization.  (2) The organization primarily employs persons 
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claims or the Majority accepts.  Our Constitution recognizes 
the free exercise of religion as something in addition to other 
kinds of expression, not because it requires less deference, but 
arguably because it requires more.  At the very least, it stands 
on an equal footing with the other protections of the First 
Amendment.  See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 
(1944) (“[I]t may be doubted that any of the great liberties 
insured by the First Article can be given higher place than the 
others.  All have preferred position in our basic scheme.  All 
are interwoven there together.”); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (“[T]he people of this nation have 
ordained in the light of history, that … these liberties 
[religious faith and political belief] are, in the long view, 
essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part 
of the citizens of a democracy.  The essential characteristic of 
these liberties is, that under their shield many types of life, 
character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and 
unobstructed.”).  The values protected by the religious 
freedom clauses of the First Amendment “have been 
zealously protected, sometimes even at the expense of other 
interests of admittedly high social importance.”  Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).   
 
                                                                                                     
who share the religious tenets of the organization.  (3) The 
organization serves primarily persons who share the religious 
tenets of the organization.  (4) The organization is a nonprofit 
organization as described in section 6033(a)(1) and section 
6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986, as amended.”).  HHS recently promulgated a new rule 
which purports to broaden the definition of “religious 
employer” to some extent.  See 78 F.R. 39870-01.  
 31 
 
In spite of that history of zealous protection, the 
Majority relegates religious liberty to second-class status, 
saying that, because Supreme Court case law incorporated the 
Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses into the Fourteenth 
Amendment‟s Due Process clause at different times, “it does 
not automatically follow that all clauses of the First 
Amendment must be interpreted identically.”  (Maj. Op. at 
24.)  Implicit in the Majority‟s position is that the Free 
Exercise Clause may be afforded less protection than the Free 
Speech Clause, and that is indeed the effect of the Majority‟s 
ruling.  I wholeheartedly disagree with that inversion of the 
special solicitude historically shown for the free exercise of 
religion.  And to any who might try to obfuscate what has 
happened today by saying, “different doesn‟t mean worse,” 
please note: courts in this Circuit and elsewhere have never 
questioned the First Amendment rights of corporations 
advancing abortion rights, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 705-06 (3d Cir. 1991) (considering 
whether a statute requiring physicians to disclose certain 
information to women seeking abortions violated the First 
Amendment rights of Planned Parenthood, a corporation), 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Planned 
Parenthood Ass’n of Hidalgo Cnty. Tex., Inc. v. Suehs, 692 
F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 2012) (considering whether a state 
“restriction on promoting elective abortions” violated Planned 
Parenthood‟s First Amendment rights), while today‟s ruling 
denies First Amendment protection to one opposed to 
abortifacients, because that opposition is grounded in 
religious conviction. 
 
Given the special place the First Amendment plays in 
our free society, the Supreme Court in Bellotti instructed that, 
instead of focusing on “whether corporations „have‟ First 
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Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive 
with those of natural persons,” “the question must be 
whether” the activity at issue falls within an area “the First 
Amendment was meant to protect.”  435 U.S. at 776.  In other 
words, the operative question under the First Amendment is 
what is being done – whether there is an infringement on 
speech or the exercise of religion – not on who is speaking or 
exercising religion.  Hence, in the political speech context 
that it then faced, the Bellotti Court emphasized that, “[i]f the 
speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest 
that the State could silence their proposed speech.  It is the 
type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a 
democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes 
from a corporation rather than an individual.”  Id. at 777.  
Likewise here, the right to object on religious grounds to 
funding someone else‟s reproductive choices is no less 
legitimate because the objector is a corporation rather than an 
individual. 
 
But even if it were appropriate to ignore the Supreme 
Court‟s advice and focus on the person asserting the right 
rather than on the right at stake, there is a blindness to the 
idea that an organization like a closely held corporation is 
something other than the united voices of its individual 
members.    The Majority detects no irony in its adoption of 
the District Court‟s comment that “„[r]eligious belief takes 
shape within the minds and hearts of individuals, and its 
protection is one of the more uniquely human rights provided 
by the Constitution‟” (Maj. Op. at 20-21 (quoting Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp., 213 WL 140110, at *7)), while it is 
simultaneously denying religious liberty to Conestoga, an 
entity that is nothing more than the common vision of five 
individuals from one family who are of one heart and mind 
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about their religious belief.
17
  Acknowledging “the Hahns‟ 
commitment to the Mennonite faith” (id. at 30), on one hand, 
while on the other acting as if the Hahns do not even exist and 
are not having their “uniquely human rights” trampled on is 
more than a little jarring.   
 
And what is the rationale for this “I can‟t see you” 
analysis?  It is that for-profit corporations like Conestoga 
were “created to make money.”  (Id. at 21.)  It is the profit-
making character of the corporation, not the corporate form 
itself, that the Majority treats as decisively disqualifying 
Conestoga from seeking the protections of the First 
Amendment or RFRA.  (See id. at 22 (“We will not draw the 
conclusion that, just because courts have recognized the free 
exercise rights of churches and other religious entities, it 
necessarily follows that for-profit, secular corporations can 
exercise religion.”).)  That argument treats the line between 
profit-motivated and non-profit entities as much brighter than 
it actually is, since for-profit corporations pursue non-profit 
goals on a regular basis.
18
  More important for present 
                                              
17
 We are dealing here with a closely held corporation, 
and we need not determine whether or how a publicly traded 
corporation, with widely distributed ownership, might 
endeavor to exercise religion.  Those issues can be left for 
another day. 
18
 It is commonplace for corporations to have mission 
statements and credos that go beyond profit maximization.  
When people speak of “good corporate citizens” they are 
typically referring to community support and involvement, 
among other things.  Beyond that, recent developments in 
corporate law regarding “Benefit” or “B” corporations 
significantly undermine the narrow view that all for-profit 
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corporations are concerned with profit maximization alone.  
As one academic has said, “[o]n a secular level, society 
appears to have already recognized this, giving form to the 
yearning of investors, customers, employees, and officers to 
combine and form businesses consistent with their particular 
values and convictions.  This is evidenced by developments 
both in the marketplace and in state legislatures, such as the 
promulgation of „Benefit Corporation‟ statutes and the „B 
Corporation‟ movement.”  Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked 
Private Square at 57-58, 51 Houston L. Rev. (forthcoming 
2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2173801
&download=yes; see also Margaret Blair, The Four 
Functions of Corporate Personhood at 31, Public Law & 
Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 12-15, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2037356 (noting that corporations 
“support the building, preserving, and sustaining of human 
institutions. …  [L]arge corporations nearly always have 
broader purposes than just the enrichment of shareholders, 
purposes such as providing safe and reliable products, good 
jobs for employees, new treatments for diseases, investment 
options for small investors, financing for housing or college, 
or access to communication networks that link individuals 
around the globe, make vast amounts of information available 
to them, and give them an outlet for self-expression.  While 
investors in these institutions expect, and deserve, to get a 
return on their investment, profits for shareholders are clearly 
not the only value being created by such enterprises.”); 
Christopher Lacovara, Strange Creatures: A Hybrid 
Approach to Fiduciary Duty in Benefit Corporations, 2011 
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 815 (discussing “[b]enefit corporations, 
or „B-Corps,‟ [which] represent a new corporate legal form 
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purposes, however, the kind of distinction the majority draws 
between for-profit corporations and non-profit corporations 
has been considered and expressly rejected in other First 
Amendment cases.  
 
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, for 
example, the Supreme Court said, “[b]y suppressing the 
speech of manifold corporations, both for-profit and 
nonprofit, the Government prevents their voices and 
viewpoints from reaching the public and advising voters on 
which persons or entities are hostile to their interests.”  558 
U.S. at 354 (emphasis added); see also Perry v. Los Angeles 
Police Dep’t, 121 F.3d 1365, 1371 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Once it 
is decided that the activity here is expressive activity, fully 
protected by the First Amendment, the fact that plaintiffs are 
not nonprofit organizations does not affect the level of 
protection accorded to their speech.”); Transp. Alts., Inc. v. 
City of New York, 218 F. Supp. 2d 423, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(“[D]rawing distinctions between organizations based on for-
profit or non-profit sponsorship in determining how much to 
charge to hold an event [in a public park] runs afoul of the 
First Amendment.”).  Because the First Amendment protects 
speech and religious activity generally, an entity‟s profit-
seeking motive is not sufficient to defeat its speech or free 
exercise claims.  See Hobby Lobby, 2013 WL 3216103, at 
                                                                                                     
designed to accommodate the dual profit-making and public 
benefit goals of the social enterprise movement”).  There is 
absolutely no evidence that Conestoga exists solely to make 
money.  It is operated, rather, to accomplish the specific 
vision of its deeply religious owners.  While making money is 
part of that vision, the government has effectively conceded 
that Conestoga has more than profit on its corporate agenda. 
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*15 (“We see no reason the Supreme Court would recognize 
constitutional protection for a corporation‟s political 
expression but not its religious expression.”). 
 
The forceful dissent of Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., in 
EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 
1988), put the point plainly: 
 
The First Amendment, guaranteeing the free 
exercise of religion to every person within the 
nation, is a guarantee that [for-profit 
corporations may] rightly invoke[].  Nothing in 
the broad sweep of the amendment puts 
corporations outside its scope.  Repeatedly and 
successfully, corporations have appealed to the 
protection the Religious Clauses afford or 
authorize.  Just as a corporation enjoys the right 
of free speech guaranteed by the First 
Amendment, so a corporation enjoys the right 
guaranteed by the First Amendment to exercise 
religion. 
 The First Amendment does not say that 
only one kind of corporation enjoys this right.  
The First Amendment does not say that only 
religious corporations or only not-for-profit 
corporations are protected.  The First 
Amendment does not authorize Congress to 
pick and choose the persons or the entities or 
the organizational forms that are free to exercise 
their religion.  All persons – and under our 
Constitution all corporations are persons – are 
free.  A statute cannot subtract from their 
freedom. 
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Id. at 623 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).   
 
Oddly, the government‟s opposing view, adopted by 
the Majority, appears to be itself a species of religion, based 
on the idea that seeking after filthy lucre is sin enough to 
deprive one of constitutional protection, and taking “[t]he 
theological position … that human beings should worship 
God on Sundays or some other chosen day and go about their 
business without reference to God the rest of the time.”  Id. at 
625.  There is certainly in the text of the Constitution no 
support for this peculiar doctrine, and what precedent there is 
on the role of religion in the world of commerce is to the 
contrary.  See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982) 
(allowing Amish business owner to raise a free exercise 
defense to his alleged failure to pay social security taxes for 
his employees); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 601 
(1961) (allowing Jewish “merchants” in Philadelphia to 
challenge the city‟s Sunday-closing laws because the laws 
allegedly infringed on their free exercise of religion).  As the 
Tenth Circuit sitting en banc noted in Hobby Lobby, the 
Supreme Court‟s decisions establish that Free Exercise rights 
do not evaporate when one is involved in a for-profit 
business.  Hobby Lobby, 2013 WL 3216103, at *14 (citing 
Lee and Braunfeld).
19
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 The government emphasizes that, in Amos, “the 
Supreme Court held that a gymnasium run by the Mormon 
Church was free to discharge a building engineer who failed 
to observe the Church‟s standards,” but that, in so doing, “the 
Court stressed that the Church did not operate the gym on a 
for-profit basis.”  (Appellee‟s Br. at 18.)  During oral 
argument, counsel for the government relied on that 
characterization of Amos to imply for the first time that 
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granting any free exercise rights to a for-profit corporation 
would inevitably trigger Establishment Clause problems, as 
any accommodation to the corporation would come at the 
expense of similarly situated corporations that had not 
received a religious exemption.  As I have already noted, see 
supra Part III.A.1, Amos did not turn on a for-profit versus 
non-profit distinction, and, in fact, the Court left open any 
question regarding the Establishment Clause impact of 
granting a religious exemption to a for-profit corporation.  
More fundamentally, the government mistakes the 
scope of the Establishment Clause.  Under the so-called 
“endorsement” test for evaluating Establishment Clause 
challenges, courts look to “whether the challenged 
governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of 
„endorsing‟ religion.”  Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 
573, 592 (1989).  “Of course, the word „endorsement‟ is not 
self-defining,” id. at 593, but the Supreme Court “has long 
recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) 
accommodate religious practices and that it may do so 
without violating the Establishment Clause,” Hobbie v. 
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144-
45 (1987); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 627-28 
(Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that government “may 
„accommodate‟ the free exercise of religion by relieving 
people from generally applicable rules that interfere with their 
religious callings,” without “necessarily signify[ing] an 
official endorsement of religious observance over disbelief”).  
Otherwise, the enforcement of laws that “cut[] across 
religious sensibilities, as [they] often do[],” would “put[] 
those affected to the choice of taking sides between God and 
government,” id., a choice that will often place a substantial 
burden on religious devotion, see infra Part III.A.2.a.  “In 
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So, to recap, it is not the corporate form itself that can 
justify discriminating against Conestoga, and it is not the 
pursuit of profits that can justify it.  Yet somehow, by the 
miracle-math employed by HHS and its lawyers, those two 
negatives add up to a positive right in the government to 
discriminate against a for-profit corporation.  Thus, despite 
the Supreme Court‟s insistence that “no official, high or petty, 
                                                                                                     
such circumstances, accommodating religion reveals nothing 
beyond a recognition that general rules can unnecessarily 
offend the religious conscience when they offend the 
conscience of secular society not at all.”  Weisman, 505 U.S. 
at 628.  If the Supreme Court were of a contrary mind, then 
Amos, Yoder, Sherbert, and a host of other cases in which the 
Court granted exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause 
would have been decided differently. 
Thus, it cannot be, as the government seems to 
suggest, that a decision to accommodate the Hahns‟ and 
Conestoga‟s constitutionally protected religious liberties 
would result in an impermissible endorsement of their 
religion.  The Establishment Clause does not prohibit what 
the Free Exercise Clause demands.  To be sure, the 
government may, under certain circumstances, “cross[] the 
line from permissible accommodation to unconstitutional 
establishment.”  Id. at 629 (concurring in majority holding 
that school-mandated prayer at graduation ceremony violated 
the Establishment Clause).  But granting an exemption to 
Conestoga and the Hahns in this case would do nothing more 
than “lift a discernible burden on the[ir] free exercise of 
religion,” id., and “Government efforts to accommodate 
religion are permissible when they remove burdens on the 
free exercise of religion,” Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601 
n.51. 
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can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein,” W. Va. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), the government 
claims the right to force Conestoga and its owners to facilitate 
the purchase and use of contraceptive drugs and devices, 
including abortifacients, all the while telling them that they 
do not even have a basis to speak up in opposition.
20
  
Remarkable. 
 
I reject that power grab and would hold that Conestoga 
may invoke the right to religious liberty on its own behalf.
21
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 Conestoga is silenced because it is a for-profit 
corporation, and the Hahns must likewise sit down and be 
quiet because, by the government‟s reasoning, the Mandate 
really does not affect them.  (See Appellee‟s Br. at 22 
(arguing that “[t]he contraceptive-coverage requirement does 
not compel the [Hahns] as individuals to do anything,” but, 
rather, “[i]t is only the legally separate corporation that has 
any obligation under the mandate” (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (third alteration in original)).) 
21
 Because of that conclusion, I need not consider at 
length the alternative argument that, even if Conestoga itself 
is without First Amendment protection, it may assert the free 
exercise claims of its owners, the Hahns.  Suffice it to say that 
there is persuasive precedent for that approach in the context 
of close corporations.  See Commack Self-Serv. Kosher 
Meats, Inc. v. Hooker, 680 F.3d 194, 200 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(allowing a kosher deli to press Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clause claims on behalf of its owners); 
Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1120 & 1120 n.9 
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(9th Cir. 2009) (“We have held that a corporation has 
standing to assert the free exercise right of its owners. …  
[A]n organization that asserts the free exercise rights of its 
owners need not be primarily religious … .”); Townley, 859 
F.2d at 620 n.15 (holding that “it is unnecessary to address 
the abstract issue whether a for profit corporation has rights 
under the Free Exercise Clause independent of those of its 
shareholders and officers” because the corporation in question 
“presents no rights of its own different from or greater than its 
owners‟ rights,” and allowing the corporation “standing to 
assert [its owners‟] Free Exercise rights”); Tyndale House 
Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 504 F. Supp. 2d 106, 116 (D.D.C. 
2012) (“[T]he beliefs of Tyndale and its owners are 
indistinguishable.”); Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 
980, 988 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (“For the purposes of the pending 
motion, however, Weingartz Supply Co. may exercise 
standing in order to assert the free exercise rights of its 
president, Daniel Weingartz, being identified as „his 
company.‟”); State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, 
Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 850-51 (Minn. 1985) (holding that a 
“conclusory assertion that a corporation has no constitutional 
right to free exercise of religion is unsupported,” and 
allowing a free exercise claim because the corporation‟s 
owners “are the ones asserting the first amendment right to 
the free exercise of religion”).   
The Majority forecloses that line of argument, insisting 
that, although “[t]he corporate form offers several advantages 
„not the least of which was limitation of liability,‟ … the 
shareholder must give up some prerogatives” in return (Maj. 
Op. at 27), including, apparently, his religious convictions.  
That conclusion rests on a mistaken idea that the business 
purposes for which corporate law has developed and that 
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2. The Appellants’ RFRA Claim 
 
Turning to the merits of the Appellants‟ RFRA claim, I 
am satisfied that both Conestoga and the Hahns have shown a 
likelihood of success.  RFRA has been called the “most 
important congressional action with respect to religion since 
the First Congress proposed the First Amendment,” Douglas 
Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 209, 243 (1994), 
and it exists specifically to provide heightened protection to 
the free exercise of religion.  The statute was produced by an 
“extraordinary ecumenical coalition in the Congress of 
liberals and conservatives, Republicans and Democrats, 
Northerners and Southerners, and in the country as a whole, a 
very broad coalition of groups that have traditionally 
defended … the various religious faiths … as well as those 
who champion the cause of civil liberties.”  Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearing Before the 
                                                                                                     
underpin the legal fiction of a corporation being separate from 
its owners must mean that the people behind the corporate 
veil are to be ignored for all purposes.  That notion breezes 
past the very specific business objectives for which the 
corporate veil exists, namely, “to facilitate aggregations of 
capital,” Entel v. Guilden, 223 F. Supp. 129, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 
1963), and “to limit or eliminate the personal liability of 
corporate principals,” Goldman v. Chapman, 844 N.Y.S.2d 
126, 127 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007).  Nothing in the history of 
the important doctrine of a corporation‟s separate identity 
justifies the limitation on civil rights that the Majority 
endorses.  See Hobby Lobby, 2013 WL 3216103, at *27 
(Hartz, J., concurring) (“What does limiting financial risk 
have to do with choosing to live a religious life?”). 
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Subcomm. On Civil & Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 13 (1991) (statement of Rep. 
Solarz, chief sponsor of H.R. 5377). 
 
Those diverse voices came together in response to the 
Supreme Court‟s decision in Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872 (1990), in which, while upholding a law that banned 
the use of peyote even for sacramental purposes, the Court 
held that the First Amendment‟s Free Exercise Clause does 
not require judges to engage in a case-by-case assessment of 
the religious burdens imposed by facially constitutional laws.  
Id. at 883-90.  Congress quickly decried Smith as having 
“virtually eliminated the requirement that the government 
justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral 
toward religion.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4).  The stringent 
standard of review imposed by RFRA on government action 
reflects Congress‟s judgment that “governments should not 
substantially burden religious exercise without compelling 
justification.”  Id. § 2000bb(a)(3).  It is intended “to restore 
the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972) … in all cases where free exercise of religion is 
substantially burdened” by the Federal government, id. 
§ 2000bb(b)(1),
22
 and we are to look to pre-Smith free 
                                              
22
 Although the Supreme Court held RFRA 
unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments 
because it exceeded Congress‟ power under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507 (1997), it “continues to apply to the Federal 
Government,” Sossamon v. Texas, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 
1651, 1656 (2011). 
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exercise jurisprudence in assessing RFRA claims, see Vill. of 
Bensenville v. FAA, 457 F.3d 52, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 
In short, RFRA restores the judicial standard of review 
known as “strict scrutiny,” which is “the most demanding test 
known to constitutional law.”  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507, 534 (1997).  The statute prohibits the Federal 
government from “substantially burden[ing] a person‟s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of 
general applicability,”
23
 id. § 2000bb-1(a), except when the 
                                              
23
 Having determined (erroneously) that corporations, 
even closely held ones, do not enjoy religious liberty, the 
Majority declined to “decide whether such a corporation is a 
„person‟ under the RFRA.”  (Maj. Op. at 28-29.)  I believe 
that it is.  Although the statute itself does not define “person,” 
the fallback definition section in the United States Code 
provides that “unless the context indicates otherwise … the 
word[] „person‟ … include[s] corporations, companies, 
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock 
companies, as well as individuals … .”  1 U.S.C. § 1; see also 
Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1707 (2012) 
(explaining that the word “person” often includes 
corporations, and that Congress and the Supreme Court often 
use the word “individual” “to distinguish between a natural 
person and a corporation”); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
436 U.S. 658, 687 (1978) (“[B]y 1871, it was well understood 
that corporations should be treated as natural persons for 
virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory 
analysis.”).  Given that corporations can assert religious 
exercise claims, see supra Part III.A.1, the District Court 
erred in concluding that “context indicates” that a for-profit 
corporation is not a “person” for purposes of RFRA.  
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government can “demonstrat[e] that application of the burden 
to the person – (1) is in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest,” id. 
§ 2000bb-1.  The term “exercise of religion” “includes any 
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central 
to, a system of religious belief.”  Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A), 
incorporated by 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4).  A person whose 
religious practices are burdened in violation of RFRA “may 
assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial 
proceeding and obtain appropriate relief.”  Id. § 2000bb-1(c). 
 
a. Substantial Burden 
Under RFRA, “a rule imposes a substantial burden on 
the free exercise of religion if it prohibits a practice that is 
both sincerely held by and rooted in the religious beliefs of 
the party asserting the claim.”  United States v. Ali, 682 F.3d 
705, 710 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Within the related context of the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, a “substantial burden” 
exists where: (1) “a follower is forced to choose between 
following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits 
otherwise generally available to other [persons] versus 
abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in order to 
                                                                                                     
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 2013 WL 140110, at *10.  
See generally Hobby Lobby, 2013 WL 3216103, at *12 
(“[T]he government has given us no persuasive reason to 
think that Congress meant „person‟ in RFRA to mean 
anything other than its default meaning in the Dictionary Act 
– which includes corporations regardless of their profit-
making status.”). 
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receive a benefit”; or (2) “the government puts substantial 
pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior 
and to violate his beliefs.”  Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 
272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 
The substantial burden test derives from the Supreme 
Court‟s decisions in Sherbert and Yoder.  In Sherbert, the 
Court held that a state‟s denial of unemployment benefits to a 
Seventh-Day Adventist for refusing to work on Saturdays 
substantially burdened the exercise of her religious belief 
against working on Saturdays.  The state law at issue in that 
case 
 
force[d] her to choose between following the 
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, 
on the one hand, and abandoning one of the 
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, 
on the other hand.  Governmental imposition of 
such a choice puts the same kind of burden 
upon the free exercise of religion as would a 
fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday 
worship. 
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.  And in Yoder the Court held that a 
compulsory school attendance law substantially burdened the 
religious exercise of Amish parents who refused to send their 
children to high school.  The burden in Yoder was a fine of 
between five and fifty dollars.  The Court held that burden to 
be “not only severe, but inescapable,” requiring the parents 
“to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets 
of their religious belief.”  Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218. 
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The District Court here failed to appreciate the 
applicability of those precedents.  It held, for two reasons, 
that the burden imposed by the Mandate on Conestoga and 
the Hahns was insubstantial.  First, it said that Conestoga, as a 
for-profit corporation, lacks religious rights and so can suffer 
no burden on them, and, relatedly, that any harm to the 
Hahns‟ religious liberty is “too attenuated to be substantial” 
because it is Conestoga, not they, that must face the Mandate.  
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 2013 WL 140110, at *12; 
see also id. at *14 (“Conestoga‟s corporate form … separates 
the Hahns from the requirements of the ACA, as the 
Women‟s Preventive Healthcare regulations apply only to 
Conestoga, a secular corporation without free exercise rights, 
not the Hahns.  Whatever burden the Hahns may feel from 
being involved with a for-profit corporation that provides 
health insurance that could possibly be used to pay for 
contraceptives, that burden is simply too indirect to be 
considered substantial under the RFRA.”).  That line of 
argument is fallacious, for the reasons I have just discussed 
and will not repeat.  See supra Part III.A.1. 
 
Relying on the recently reversed panel decision in 
Hobby Lobby, the District Court‟s second line of argument 
was that “the Hahns have not demonstrated that [the 
Mandate] constitute[s] a substantial burden upon their 
religion,” Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 2013 WL 
140110, at *12, because “the ultimate and deeply private 
choice to use an abortifacient contraceptive rests not with the 
Hahns, but with Conestoga‟s employees,” id. at *13.  As the 
District Court saw it, “any burden imposed by the regulations 
is too attenuated to be considered substantial” because “[a] 
series of events must first occur before the actual use of an 
abortifacient would come into play,” including that “the 
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payment for insurance [must be made] to a group health 
insurance plan that will cover contraceptive services …; the 
abortifacients must be made available to Conestoga 
employees through a pharmacy or other healthcare facility; 
and a decision must be made by a Conestoga employee and 
her doctor, who may or may not choose to avail themselves to 
these services.”  Id. at *14.  “Such an indirect and attenuated 
relationship,” the Court held, “appears unlikely to establish 
the necessary substantial burden.”  Id. at *12 (quoting Hobby 
Lobby, No. 12-6294, slip op. at 7, rev’d en banc, __ F.3d __, 
2013 WL 3216103 (10th Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
The problem with that reasoning is that it 
fundamentally misapprehends the substance of the Hahns‟ 
claim.  As the Seventh Circuit rightly pointed out when 
granting an injunction in the Mandate case before it, “[t]he 
religious-liberty violation at issue here inheres in the coerced 
coverage of contraception, abortifacients, sterilization, and 
related services, not – or perhaps more precisely, not only – in 
the later purchase or use of contraception or related services.”  
Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353, at *3 (7th 
Cir. Dec. 28, 2012); see also Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. 
v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 123 (D.D.C. 2012) 
(“Because it is the coverage, not just the use, of the 
contraceptives at issue to which the plaintiffs object, it is 
irrelevant that the use of the contraceptives depends on the 
independent decisions of third parties.”); Grote Indus., LLC v. 
Sebelius, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2012 WL 6725905, at *6 (S.D. 
Ind. Dec. 27, 2012) (“We acknowledge that Plaintiffs object 
not just to the use of contraceptives, but to the coverage 
itself.”).  In requiring them to provide the offending insurance 
coverage, the Mandate requires the Hahns and Conestoga to 
 49 
 
take direct actions that violate the tenets of their Mennonite 
faith, with the threat of severe penalties for non-compliance.  
They face the “inescapable choice” between facilitating the 
provision of “drugs and services that they believe are immoral 
(and thereby commit[ting] an immoral act),” or “suffer[ing] 
severe penalties for non-compliance with the Mandate.”  
(Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 26-27.)  As explained in Sherbert 
and Yoder, religious exercise is substantially burdened by a 
law that puts substantial pressure on a person to commit an 
act discouraged or forbidden by that person‟s faith, and the 
Hahns‟ Mennonite faith forbids them not only from using 
certain contraceptives, but from paying for others to use them 
as well.  Cf. United States v. Indianapolis Baptist Temple, 224 
F.3d 627, 629 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The Free Exercise Clause … 
provides considerable … protection for the ability to practice 
(through the performance or non-performance of certain 
actions) one‟s religion.”). 
 
Even if Conestoga‟s and the Hahns‟ only religious 
objection were the ultimate use of the offending 
contraceptives by Conestoga employees, however, the fact 
that the final decision on use involves a series of sub-
decisions does not render the burden on their religious 
exercise insubstantial.  Nothing in RFRA suggests that 
indirect pressure cannot violate the statute.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb-1(a) (prohibiting not “direct” burdens, but 
“substantial” ones).  Indeed, even though a burden may be 
characterized as “indirect,” “the Supreme Court has indicated 
that indirectness is not a barrier to finding a substantial 
burden.”  Tyndale, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 123.  The claimant in 
Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security 
Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), quit his job because, based on 
his religious beliefs, he could not work in a factory that 
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produced tank turrets.  The state denied him unemployment 
benefits and argued that his objection was unfounded because 
he had been willing to work in a different factory that 
produced materials that might be used for tanks.  The 
Supreme Court held that, in determining whether Thomas‟s 
religious beliefs were burdened, it could not second-guess his 
judgment about what connection to armament production was 
unacceptably close for him: “Thomas drew a line, and it is not 
for us to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable one.”  
Id. at 715.  “While the compulsion may be indirect,” the 
Court reasoned, “the infringement upon free exercise is 
nonetheless substantial.”  Id. at 718.  The Court further 
instructed that “[c]ourts should not undertake to dissect 
religious beliefs” when analyzing substantial burden 
questions.  Id. at 715.  The Appellants here are entitled, just 
as much as Thomas was, to make judgments about when their 
connection with the acquisition and use of contraceptives 
becomes close enough to contravene their faith. 
 
Moreover, if the indirectness of the ultimate decision 
to use contraceptives truly rendered insubstantial the harm to 
an employer, then no exemptions to the Mandate would be 
necessary.  The harm to the Catholic Church by one of its 
employees‟ decision to use an abortifacient would be equally 
as indirect, and, by the District Court‟s logic, would pose 
equally as insubstantial a burden on the Church‟s free 
exercise rights.  But the Mandate does provide an exemption 
for so-called “religious employers,” see supra note 16, and 
the regulation itself thus allows that an employee‟s choice 
that only indirectly affects an employer can result in 
substantial harm to the employer.
24
 
                                              
24
 The same logic applies to the District Court‟s 
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It is true, as the Supreme Court cautioned in United 
States v. Lee, that “every person cannot be shielded from all 
the burdens incident to exercising every aspect of the right to 
practice religious beliefs.  When followers of a particular sect 
enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits 
they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience 
and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes 
which are binding on others in that activity.”  455 U.S. at 261.  
But even in Lee, the Court held that the requirement to pay 
Social Security taxes substantially burdened a for-profit 
Amish employer‟s religious exercise.
25
  The Court held that, 
                                                                                                     
statement that there is no difference to employers if, on one 
hand, their employees purchase contraceptives with salary or, 
on the other, they obtain them free of charge through 
company-provided health insurance.  Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corp., 2013 WL 140110, at *13; see also 
Autocam, No. 1:12-cv-1096, slip op. at 11 (noting that 
plaintiffs will be “paying indirectly for the same services 
through wages” that their employees may choose to use “for 
contraception products and services”).  If that were the case, 
no exemptions would be required, even for religious 
employers.  In a free society, there is a world of difference 
between paying money with no strings attached as 
compensation for an employee‟s work and being forced to 
fund insurance coverage that expressly provides for goods 
and services believed to be morally reprehensible. 
25
 The Supreme Court in Lee did not use the phrase 
“substantial burden,” but, since Lee, the Court has 
consistently described its holding in that case as establishing 
that the government may substantially burden religious 
exercise only if it can show that the regulation in question 
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“[b]ecause the payment of the taxes or receipt of benefits 
violates Amish religious beliefs, compulsory participation in 
the social security system interferes with their free exercise 
rights.”  Id. at 257.  Although the Court held that religious 
adherents who enter the commercial marketplace do not have 
an absolute right to receive a religious exemption from all 
legal requirements that conflict with their faith, id. at 261, the 
fact that the Court concluded that there was a substantial 
burden and proceeded to apply strict scrutiny illustrates that 
the government does not have carte blanche to substantially 
burden the religious exercise of for-profit corporations and 
their owners. 
 
Thus, I would hold that the District Court erred in 
concluding that the Mandate does not substantially burden 
Conestoga‟s and the Hahns‟ free exercise of religion. 
 
  b. Strict Scrutiny 
 
If government action “substantially burdens” religious 
exercise, it will be upheld under RFRA only if it “is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest,” and “is 
                                                                                                     
satisfies strict scrutiny  –  that is, that the regulation furthers a 
compelling governmental interest in the least restrictive 
means possible.  In Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 
680 (1989), for example, the Court described the holding in 
Lee in the following manner: “[O]ur decision in Lee 
establishes that even a substantial burden would be justified 
by the „broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax 
system,‟ free of „myriad exceptions flowing from a wide 
variety of religious beliefs.‟”  Id. at 699-700 (quoting Lee, 
455 U.S. at 260) (emphasis added). 
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the least restrictive means” of accomplishing that interest.  42 
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.  Neither the Majority nor the District 
Court addressed that strict scrutiny test, because they 
disposed of the case on other grounds.  The Supreme Court 
has said that strict scrutiny must not be “„strict in theory, but 
fatal in fact.‟”  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200, 237 (1995).  And it has recently noted that “the opposite 
is also true”: “[s]trict scrutiny must not be strict in theory but 
feeble in fact.”  Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, slip op. at 
13, 570 U.S. __ (2013).  Only the feeblest application of strict 
scrutiny could result in upholding the Mandate on this record. 
 
   i. Compelling Interest 
 
Compelling interests are those “of the highest order,” 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993), or “paramount interests,” Thomas 
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).  The government 
maintains that the Mandate advances two compelling 
governmental interests: “public health and gender equality.”  
(Appellee‟s Br. at 34.)  In particular, it states that the “health 
services at issue here relate to an interest – a woman‟s control 
over her procreation – that is so compelling as to be 
constitutionally protected from state interference.”  
(Appellee‟s Br. at 34-35.) 
 
Preserving public health and ending gender 
discrimination are indeed of tremendous societal significance.  
The government can certainly claim “a compelling interest in 
safeguarding the public health by regulating the health care 
and insurance markets.”  Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 
43 (D.D.C. 2011).  And, as it is of undoubted “importance, 
both to the individual and to society, [to] remov[e] the 
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barriers to economic advancement and political and social 
integration that have historically plagued certain 
disadvantaged groups, including women,” Roberts v. U.S. 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984), there is a compelling 
interest in “[a]ssuring women equal access to … goods, 
privileges, and advantages” enjoyed by men, id.   
 
Assuming for the sake of discussion that the Mandate 
may actually advance those interests, it must nevertheless be 
observed that the mere “invocation” of a “general interest in 
promoting public health and safety [or, for that matter, gender 
equality] … is not enough” under RFRA.  Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
438 (2006).  The government must show that the application 
of the Mandate to the Hahns and Conestoga in particular 
furthers those compelling interests.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-
1(b)(1); see Tyndale, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 125 (providing that 
the government “must show that requiring [appellants] to 
provide the contraceptives to which they object … will 
further the government‟s compelling interests in promoting 
public health and in providing women equal access to health 
care”); see also O Centro, 546 U.S. at 430 (“RFRA requires 
the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest 
test is satisfied through application of the challenged law „to 
the person‟ – the particular claimant whose sincere exercise 
of religion is being substantially burdened.” (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b))).  Courts are required to “look[] 
beyond broadly formulated interests justifying the general 
applicability of government mandates and scrutinize[] the 
asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular 
religious claimants.”  Id. at 431; see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 
236 (“[I]t was incumbent on the State to show with more 
particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory 
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education would be adversely affected by granting an 
exemption to the Amish.”).  The government must “offer[] 
evidence that granting the requested religious 
accommodations would seriously compromise its ability to 
administer” its contraceptive Mandate.  O Centro, 546 U.S. at 
435.  It has failed to do that. 
 
The government‟s arguments against accommodating 
the Hahns and Conestoga are “undermined by the existence of 
numerous exemptions [it has already made] to the … 
mandate.”  Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1297 
(D. Colo. 2012).  By its own choice, the government has 
exempted an enormous number of employers from the 
Mandate, including “religious employers” who appear to 
share the same religious objection as Conestoga and the 
Hahns, leaving tens of millions of employees and their 
 56 
 
families untouched by it.
26
  “[A] law cannot be regarded as 
protecting an interest of the highest order when it leaves 
                                              
26
 The sheer number of employers exempted from the 
Mandate distinguishes this case from United States v. Lee.  In 
that case, the Supreme Court held that, although the 
“compulsory participation in the social security system 
interfere[d] with [the plaintiff Amish employer‟s] free 
exercise rights,” 455 U.S. at 257, the social security system 
nonetheless satisfied strict scrutiny as applied to the Amish 
employer, regardless of Congress‟s having exempted from 
social security taxes “self-employed members of other 
religious groups with similar beliefs,” id. at 255 (citation 
omitted).  As the Court described it, that provision exempted 
only a “narrow category” of “[s]elf-employed persons” who 
are members of “a religious community” that, like the Amish, 
“ha[s] its own „welfare‟ system,” id. at 261, a small group to 
say the least. 
By way of comparison, the Supreme Court held in O 
Centro that the government had failed to make a showing that 
a ban on the use of a hallucinogenic substance served a 
compelling interest as applied to a Native American tribe that 
used the substance as part of its religious services.  546 U.S. 
at 439.  The Court relied heavily on similar religious 
exemptions granted with respect to the use of peyote by 
“hundreds of thousands” of members of the Native American 
Church, and found that such broad exemptions weighed 
heavily against finding a compelling interest.  Id. at 433-34. 
With respect to the Mandate, as a result of the multiple 
and wide-reaching exemptions, millions of individuals – 
perhaps upwards of 190 million, see Newland, 881 F. Supp. 
2d at 1298 (“The government has exempted over 190 million 
health plan participants … from the preventive care coverage 
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appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest 
unprohibited.”  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. 
at 547 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).  So, 
when the government‟s proffered compelling interest applies 
equally to employers subject to a law and those exempt from 
it, “it is difficult to see how [the] same findings [supporting 
the government‟s interest] alone can preclude any 
consideration of a similar exception” for a similarly situated 
plaintiff.  O Centro, 546 U.S. at 433; see also Republican 
Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002) (noting 
that the purpose of a law is undermined when it is “so 
woefully underinclusive as to render belief in [its] purpose a 
challenge to the credulous”).  The Mandate is a classic 
example of such arbitrary underinclusiveness.  It cannot 
legitimately be said to vindicate a compelling governmental 
interest because the government has already exempted from 
its reach grandfathered plans, employers with under 50 
employees, and what it defines as “religious employers” (see 
Maj. Op. at 12 n.4), thus voluntarily allowing millions upon 
millions of people – by some estimates 190 million – to be 
covered by insurance plans that do not satisfy the supposedly 
vital interest of providing the public with free contraceptives.  
See Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, No. 12-cv-00207, 2013 WL 
3071481, at *10 (W.D. Pa. June 18, 2013) (“In light of the 
myriad exemptions to the mandate‟s requirements already 
granted, the requirement is woefully underinclusive and 
therefore does not serve a compelling government interest.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
                                                                                                     
mandate.”) – will fall outside the government‟s interest in 
increasing access to contraceptives.  This case is thus even 
further removed than O Centro from the narrow exemption 
involved in Lee. 
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   ii. Least Restrictive Means 
 
Nor can the government affirmatively establish that the 
Mandate is the least restrictive means of advancing its 
interests in health and gender equality.  Statutes fail the “least 
restrictive means” test when they are “overbroad” or 
“underinclusive.”  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 
U.S. at 546.  The underinclusiveness here is manifest, as just 
described.  Moreover, the least restrictive means test is aimed 
at uncovering “the extent to which accommodation of the 
[plaintiff] would impede the state‟s objectives,” and 
“[w]hether the state has made this showing depends on a 
comparison of the cost to the government of altering its 
activity to allow the religious practice to continue unimpeded 
versus the cost to the religious interest imposed by the 
government activity.”  S. Ridge Baptist Church v. Indus. 
Comm’n, 911 F.2d 1203, 1206 (6th Cir. 1990) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  If the government “has open to it a 
less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate interests, it may 
not choose a [regulatory] scheme that broadly stifles the 
exercise of fundamental personal liberties.”  Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 806 (1983) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
The Hahns and Conestoga argue that the government 
could directly further its interest in providing greater access to 
contraception without violating their religious exercise by, for 
example,  
 
(1) offer[ing] tax deductions or credits for the 
purchase of contraceptive services; (2) 
expand[ing] eligibility for already existing 
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federal programs that provide free 
contraception; (3) allow[ing] citizens who pay 
to use contraceptives to submit receipts to the 
government for reimbursement; or (4) 
provid[ing] incentives for pharmaceutical 
companies that manufacture contraceptives to 
provide such products to pharmacies, doctor‟s 
offices, and health clinics free of charge.  
(Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 51.)  In response, the government 
argues that the Appellants misunderstand the least-restrictive-
means test and that their proposed alternatives “would require 
federal taxpayers to pay the cost of contraceptive services for 
the employees of for-profit, secular companies.”  (Appellees‟ 
Br. at 40.)   
 
It is the government that evidently misunderstands the 
test, for while the government need not address every 
conceivable alternative, it “must refute the alternative 
schemes offered by the challenger,” United States v. Wilgus, 
638 F.3d 1274, 1288-89 (10th Cir. 2011),
27
 ultimately settling 
on a policy that is “necessary” to achieving its compelling 
goals, Fisher, slip op. at 10, 570 U.S. __.  And it must seek 
out religiously neutral alternatives before choosing policies 
that impinge on religious liberty.  Cf. Thompson v. W. States 
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002) (“The Government 
                                              
27
 As the Tenth Circuit said in Wilgus, the government 
need not “refute each and every conceivable alternative 
regulation scheme.”  Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1289.  But it “must 
support its choice of regulation, and it must refute the 
alternative schemes offered by the challenger” – “both 
through the evidence presented in the record.”  Id. 
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simply has not provided sufficient justification here.  If the 
First Amendment means anything, it means that regulating 
speech must be a last – not first – resort.  Yet here it seems to 
have been the first strategy the Government thought to try.”).  
In those responsibilities, the government has utterly failed.  It 
has made no showing that any of the Appellants‟ alternative 
ideas would be unworkable.  Cf. Fisher, slip op. at 11, 570 
U.S. __ (stating, in the context of racial preferences, that 
“[t]he reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no 
workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the … 
benefits” sought).  In fact, the government already provides 
free contraception to some women, and there has been no 
showing that increasing the distribution of it would not 
achieve the government‟s goals.  Because the government has 
not refuted that it could satisfy its interests in the wider 
distribution of contraception through any or all of the means 
suggested by Conestoga and the Hahns, without burdening 
their rights to religious liberty, the government has not shown 
that the Mandate is the least restrictive means of addressing 
those interests.  It may be that the government‟s political 
interests are better satisfied by forcing the Hahns to the 
pharmacy counter than by trying to persuade voters to support 
other means to fund free contraceptives, but political 
expediency is not synonymous with “least restrictive means.” 
 
Accordingly, the government has not met the burdens 
of strict scrutiny, and I would hold that Conestoga and the 
Hahns have established a likelihood of succeeding on the 
merits of their RFRA claim. 
 
3. The Appellants’ First Amendment Claim 
 
Conestoga and the Hahns also bring a separate claim 
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under the First Amendment.  As previously discussed, the 
Supreme Court in Smith held that the Free Exercise Clause is 
not implicated when the government burdens a person‟s 
religious exercise through laws that are neutral and generally 
applicable.  494 U.S. at 879.  In contrast, “[a] law burdening 
religious practice that is not neutral or not of general 
application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.”  
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 546.  
“Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and … 
failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the 
other has not been satisfied.”  Id. at 531.   
 
In my view, the Mandate is not generally applicable, 
and it is not neutral.  “A law fails the general applicability 
requirement if it burdens a category of religiously motivated 
conduct but exempts or does not reach a substantial category 
of conduct that is not religiously motivated and that 
undermines the purposes of the law to at least the same 
degree as the covered conduct that is religiously motivated.”  
Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 209 (3d Cir. 
2004).  Here, as already noted, the government has provided 
numerous exemptions, large categories of which are unrelated 
to religious objections, namely, the exemption for 
grandfathered plans and the exemption for employers with 
less than 50 employees.  And it seems less than neutral to say 
that some religiously motivated employers – the ones picked 
by the government – are exempt while others are not.
28
  
Finally, it is utterly arbitrary to say that religious liberties 
depend on whether a company hires 49 or 50 employees.  
                                              
28
 Because I have already discussed the “non-profit 
versus for-profit” distinction at length, see supra Part III.A.1, 
I will not repeat my reasons for rejecting it in this context. 
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Under the First Amendment, therefore, the Mandate is to be 
subjected to strict scrutiny.  As discussed above in relation to 
the RFRA claim brought by Conestoga and the Hahns, see 
supra Part III.A.2.b, the Mandate does not pass that daunting 
test, and, accordingly, they have demonstrated a reasonable 
likelihood of succeeding on their First Amendment claim. 
 
B. Irreparable Harm 
 
Focusing only on the question of likelihood of success 
on the merits, neither the District Court nor the Majority 
evaluated whether Conestoga and the Hahns have 
demonstrated irreparable harm.  It is a painful topic to 
confront, as it brings to the fore the immediate and 
unconscionable consequences of the government‟s 
overreaching.   
 
“Irreparable harm is injury for which a monetary 
award cannot be adequate compensation.”  Int’l Dairy Foods 
Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “It is well-established that „[t]he 
loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods 
of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.‟”  Hohe 
v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Elrod v. 
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)) (alteration in original).  In 
fact, “[w]hen an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right 
is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of 
irreparable injury is necessary.”  11A Charles Alan Wright, 
Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 2948.1 (2d ed. 1995).  That principle applies 
with equal force to a violation of RFRA because RFRA 
enforces First Amendment freedoms.  See Kikumura v. 
Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 963 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[C]ourts have 
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held that a plaintiff satisfies the irreparable harm analysis by 
alleging a violation of RFRA.”); Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 
468, 482 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Courts have persuasively found that 
irreparable harm accompanies a substantial burden on an 
individual‟s rights to the free exercise of religion under 
RFRA.” (citations omitted)).  Threats to First Amendment 
rights are often seen as so potentially harmful that they justify 
a lower threshold of proof to show a likelihood of success on 
the merits.  Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. United States, 945 F. 
Supp. 772, 783 (D. Del. 1996) (“In a case … in which the 
alleged injury is a threat to First Amendment interests, the 
finding of irreparable injury is often tied to the likelihood of 
success on the merits.”), aff’d, 520 U.S. 1141 (1997). 
 
Because the government demanded that the Hahns and 
Conestoga capitulate before their appeal was even heard,
29
 
and because the District Court denied preliminary injunctive 
relief, the severe hardship has begun.  (See Maj. Op. at 13 
(noting that “Conestoga is currently complying with the 
Mandate”).)  Faced with ruinous fines, the Hahns and 
Conestoga are being forced to pay for the offending 
                                              
29
 Given the government‟s recent decision to delay the 
implementation of other aspects of the ACA, see Zachary A. 
Goldfarb & Sandhya Somashekhar, White House Delays 
Health-Care Rule that Businesses Provide Insurance to 
Workers, Washington Post, July 2, 2013, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-house-delays-
health-care-rule-that-businesses-provide-insurance-to-
workers/2013/07/02/f87e7892-e360-11e2-aef3-
339619eab080_story.html, one wonders why it could not give 
religious believers some breathing room during court 
consideration of the Mandate. 
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contraceptives, including abortifacients, in violation of their 
religious convictions, and every day that passes under those 
conditions is a day in which irreparable harm is inflicted.  See 
Elrod, 427 U.S. at 373 (“The loss of First Amendment 
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably 
constitutes irreparable injury.”).  The Majority‟s ruling 
guarantees that grievous harm will go on and, as the days pile 
up, worsen.  See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-1144, 2013 WL 
1277419, at *6-*11 (3d Cir. Jan. 29, 2013) (Jordan, J., 
dissenting). 
 
C. The Remaining Injunction Factors 
 
Conestoga and the Hahns have also met the remaining 
preliminary injunction factors.  A preliminary injunction 
would not result in greater harm to the government but would 
merely restore the status quo between the parties.  “One of the 
goals of the preliminary injunction analysis is to maintain that 
status quo, defined as the last, peaceable, noncontested status 
of the parties.”  Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 
700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The last uncontested status between the 
parties was prior to January 1, 2013, the date the Mandate 
became effective against the Appellants.  “Granting an 
injunction would restore that state of affairs.”  Opticians 
Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 197 
(3d Cir. 1990).  Moreover, the harm to Conestoga and the 
Hahns caused by the denial of the preliminary injunction 
vastly outweighs the harm to the government were an 
injunction to be granted.  Again, any infringement on a 
person‟s First Amendment rights – even if only for a short 
time – constitutes irreparable injury.  See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 
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373.  Although a preliminary injunction in this case might 
“temporarily interfere[] with the government‟s goal of 
increasing cost-free access to contraception and sterilization,” 
that interest “is outweighed by the harm to the substantial 
religious-liberty interests on the other side.”  Korte v. 
Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353, at *5 (7th Cir. 
Dec. 28, 2013); see also Monaghan v. Sebelius, __ F. Supp. 
2d __, 2012 WL 6738476, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2012) 
(“The harm of delaying the implementation of a statute that 
may later be deemed constitutional is outweighed by the risk 
of substantially burdening the free exercise of religion.”). 
 
In addition, a preliminary injunction would not harm 
the public interest.  On the contrary, “[a]s a practical matter, 
if a plaintiff demonstrates both a likelihood of success on the 
merits and irreparable injury, it almost always will be the case 
that the public interest will favor the plaintiff.”  Am. Tel. & 
Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 
1427 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994).  And “[t]he public as a whole has a 
significant interest in ensuring … [the] protection of First 
Amendment liberties.”  Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d 258, 278 
(6th Cir. 2009).  An injunction would simply put Conestoga‟s 
employees in the same position as the tens of millions of 
employees and their families whose employers have already 
been exempted from the Mandate. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This is a controversial and, in some ways, complex 
case, but in the final analysis it should not be hard for us to 
join the many courts across the country that have looked at 
the Mandate and its implementation and concluded that the 
government should be enjoined from telling sincere believers 
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in the sanctity of life to put their consciences aside and 
support other people‟s reproductive choices.  The District 
Court‟s ruling should be reversed and a preliminary 
injunction should issue. 
